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The individual investor must feel like a contestant on Let's Make A
Deal.1 First, to pursue claims for damages stemming from misconduct by
their securities brokers, investors opened Door Number One-litigation,
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1 Let's Make A Deal was a popular television game show that aired in the 1960s and
1970s on which contestants were "Traders" who would attempt to negotiate "trade ups"
of household items to better prizes. At the end of the show, for the "Big Deal of the Day,"
Traders would have to choose among Door Number One, Door Number Two, or Door
Number Three, to guess which Door revealed the most valuable prize. See Let's Make A
Deal Show Info, http://www.letsmakeadeal.com/showinfo.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2005).
329
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
along with its advantages of the jury trial and access to punitive damages. In
response, courts imposed great responsibilities on investors before they could
recover damages. 2 Courts also rebuffed investors' attempts to expand the
liability of securities industry participants for treating them unfairly.3
Despite this seemingly unmatched advantage, the securities industry
fought hard to transfer resolution of customer disputes from the courts to the
arbitration venue.4 This fight led to the Supreme Court's holding in the late
1980s that federal securities law claims were arbitrable and thus pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in customers' brokerage account agreements were
enforceable. 5 Courts closed Door Number One.
Investors then opened Door Number Two--arbitration-to pursue claims
against their brokers and their firms. Regulatory oversight of the securities
arbitration forums to support the goal of investor protection lent an air of
fairness to the process. 6 At the same time, however, reforms designed to
alleviate investors' concerns transformed a formerly quick and informal
process into a system resembling litigation.7 Parties quickly discovered that
securities arbitration was more expensive and slower than the industry
thought it would be, and required a mastery of many rules and procedures.
Moreover, the securities industry, in a classic case of "be careful what you
wish for," started doubting the wisdom of its preference for binding
2 See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of
Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDozo L. REv. 991, 1037 (2002) (reporting that
courts today expect investors to possess a certain level of sophistication to comprehend
investing in modem investment products in order to be deemed "reasonable").
3 See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide: The Collision of Ethics and
Risk In Securities Law, 64 U. Prrr. L. REv. 483, 499-507 (2003) (arguing that there is
scant judicial support for imposition of liability on brokers for failing to warn against,
monitor, or stop their customers' risky investment choices).
4 See New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Symposium on Arbitration in the Securities
Industry, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 1495, 1511-12, 1517-18 (1995) [hereinafter NYSE
Symposium] (discussing securities industry's support for enforceability of predispute
arbitration clauses in brokerage account agreements).
5 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (holding
that claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 are arbitrable); Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding that claims arising under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are arbitrable). Because virtually all broker-dealers
include a pre-dispute arbitration clause in their customer account agreements, this holding
mandated the arbitration of almost every customer dispute.
6 See discussion infra Part II.A. 1.
7 See Black & Gross, supra note 2, at 998-1005.
[Vol. 21:2 20061
SECURITIES MEDIATION
arbitration and sought judicial intervention to overturn arbitration awards.8
Door Number Two had its problems.
In 1989, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 9 began
offering mediation as an alternative to arbitration. Mediation is a process in
which a third party neutral (the mediator) assists disputing parties in settling
their dispute.' 0 NASD believed that mediation would give parties more
control over the outcome of their disputes,'1 allow parties to resolve their
disputes more quickly than arbitration, and trim parties' expenses. 12 Since
1989, securities mediation administered by NASD Dispute Resolution
(NASD-DR) 13 has exploded. 14
8 See Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do Brokerage
Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 415, 416 (2003).
9 NASD is the securities industry's largest self-regulatory organization (SRO), and is
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a national securities
association pursuant to § 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3
(2004).
10 See NASD Dispute Resolution, Mediation: An Alternate Path,
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&nodeld=530 (last visited
Nov. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Mediation: An Alternate Path] (defining mediation as "non-
binding negotiation facilitated by an experienced and independent neutral"); see also
MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (The Law and Practice of
Commercial Arbitration) § 3.15 (3d ed. 2003) (defining mediation as a process in which
"participants, together with the assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically
isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider the alternatives, and reach a
consensual settlement that will accommodate their needs"); UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, § 2(1)
(2001) (defining mediation as "a process in which a mediator facilitates communication
and negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement
regarding their dispute"). For a variety of other similar definitions, see KIMBERLEE
KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 27-28 (3d ed. 2004).
11 Parties have more control because they are the decision-makers and the mediator
fills an advisory rather than an adjudicatory function. While some mediators may make a
settlement recommendation to the parties, that recommendation is only advisory. The
parties, however, can choose to enter into a binding settlement agreement embodying that
recommendation. See David S. Ruder, Chairman, SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM,
REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOvERNORS,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC. 47 (1996) [hereinafter Ruder
Report].
12 See NASD Solicits Comment on New Mediation Program and Draft Mediation
Rules, NASD Notice to Members 95-1, at 1 (Jan. 1995) [hereinafter NASD Notice to
Members 95-1], available at
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid=1 189&elementid= 115900040
7 (follow "1995" hyperlink; then follow "95-1" hyperlink).
13 In 2000, NASD spun off its arbitration and mediation department as a wholly-
owned subsidiary, and re-named it NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. See Press Release,
NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc., NASD Launches New Dispute Resolution Subsidiary
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How does the opening of Door Number Three-mediation-affect
dispute resolution for the individual investor? First, the emergence of an
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) device for customer-broker disputes
inevitably raises the question of whether mediation is the "appropriate"' 15
mechanism to resolve these disputes. 16 In other words, is mediation more
suitable than other devices such as negotiation, arbitration or litigation?
Professors Sander and Goldberg's seminal work in developing a "user-
friendly guide" for parties to choose an appropriate dispute resolution
procedure sets forth a presumption that mediation is preferred to other ADR
devices absent contrary indications, because it has the greatest chance of
"overcoming the impediment to settlement. ' 17 Sander and Goldberg also
note, however, that in a context like customer-broker disputes where one
party, the customer, seeks to maximize his or her monetary recovery and has
no intention of doing business with the adverse party, the broker, again,
contrary indications are generally present. In such a context, public
adjudication (i.e., court) is more likely than mediation to achieve this
singular goal.18 Yet, in the context of investors' disputes, where the
(July 17, 2000), available at
http://www.nasd.com/stellent/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASD
W_01 1399&ssSourceNodeld=557.
14 Current estimates by industry players indicate "some 2,000 disputes are being
mediated in the securities arena each year." Seminar Highlights: SIA C&L Conference,
SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Apr. 2004, at 9 (reporting on speeches at SIA Compliance and
Legal Division's Annual Conference). Mediation filings have increased steadily since
1989, peaking at 1,217 cases filed for mediation in 2004. See NASD Stats, 2004, SEC.
ARB. ALERT 2005-02-01 (Jan. 12, 2005).
15 Carrie Menkel-Meadow has advanced the notion that the "A" in ADR should
stand for "appropriate," rather than "alternative." See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose
Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical And Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some
Cases), 83 GEO. L. J. 2663, 2689-90 (1995). Much of the current ADR literature has
adopted this suggestion.
16 See Jean R. Sternlight, ADR Is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where It Fits In
A System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289, 296 (2003) (noting that "various forms of dispute
resolution have different impacts on individual disputants and on society as a whole" and
stating that "it is clear that societies must make self-conscious choices as to which dispute
resolution methods should be preferred for particular disputes").
17 Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A
User-Friendly Guide to Selecting An ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49, 59-60 (1994)
(explaining that selection of an appropriate dispute resolution process for a particular
dispute should take into account multiple variables).
18 Id. at 53. Others have argued that settlement (whether direct or assisted) between
two parties of vastly different resources (e.g., the small investor against the wealthy
brokerage firm) can result in an unfair outcome for the disadvantaged party, and thus the
disadvantaged party should prefer public adjudication of the dispute. One frequently cited
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courtroom door is mainly closed due to the pre-dispute arbitration clause in
the customer agreement, and arbitration has the identifiable downside of
being overly litigious, their generalizations do not hold true. As a result,
mediation should remain an "appropriate" dispute resolution option for those
cases calling out for a compromised resolution. 19
Second, since mediation is a form of assisted settlement, why can't
investors negotiate directly with firms and brokers? Why is it necessary to
involve a third party neutral? 20 One simple answer is that one or more of the
parties to the dispute (and their lawyers) have unreasonable expectations of
the settlement value of the dispute, making settlement impossible without
third party interference.2 1 In that circumstance, a mediator can alter those
unreasonable expectations sufficiently to make settlement more possible. 22
article advocating this view is Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073
(1984). Fiss argues that many types of cases are not appropriate for settlement. Id. at
1076. But see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15 (critiquing this view); Jeffrey Seul,
Settling Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV. 881 (2004) (critiquing Fiss' argument that
disputes about "moral-laden issues" are not appropriate for settlement).
19 Certain disputes that are "slam dunk" cases for one side or the other strike me as
unsuitable for mediation. This article does not argue that investors and their advocates
should utilize mediation in lieu of arbitration for those cases. Rather, this article largely
concerns those cases that are not predictable "slam dunks." For those disputes, investors
should consider mediation.
20 Bradley Kaufman, an experienced brokerage frm lawyer, posed this question at
PLI's Securities Arbitration 2004 Program, New York, N.Y. (Aug. 11, 2004) (author's
notes on file) ("Can it really be that lawyers are too lazy to engage in hardcore settlement
discussions on their own now that securities mediation has grown into an accepted
method of dispute resolution in the industry?").
21 This explanation was offered by two panelists, Kaufman and Robbins, at PLI's
Securities Arbitration 2004 Program, New York. N.Y. (Aug. 11, 2004) (author's notes on
file); see also DAVID ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL § 16-3
(5th ed. 2003) (explaining that mediation is indicated when "the parties' contrasting
perceptions of the problem prevent them from moving forward").
22 The literature is rich with discussion and theory as to why direct negotiation
between parties may not resolve disputes. Robert Mnookin first identified four categories
of barriers to negotiation: (1) strategic barriers arising out of game theory and economic
analysis; (2) principal-agent problems; (3) cognitive barriers; and (4) reactive devaluation
(the tendency of people to discount the statements and proposals of those with whom they
are in conflict). See Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of
Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 235 (1993); see also
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 109-10 (1994) (identifying similar
barriers). A more recent Mnookin article described three tensions inherent in negotiation:
(1) the tension between creating and distributing value; (2) the tension between empathy
and assertiveness; and (3) the tension between principal and agents. See Robert H.
Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of Bilateral and
333
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Another plausible explanation is that a mediator can facilitate lawyers'
communications with their clients, thereby provoking a willingness of parties
to resolve disputes amicably rather than preserve them through continued
adversarial tactics.23 Thus, for those parties that have not succeeded in
resolving their dispute through direct negotiation, mediation provides an
alternative to arbitration. 24
This leads to the third inevitable question that investors want answered
before choosing mediation: Is mediation a "fair" alternative to arbitration?25
Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2003). Other theorists point to
wide-ranging factors, such as the mood of the negotiators (see Clark Freshman, The
Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist: What We Know And Don't Know About How
Mood Relates to Successful Negotiation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 19), habit (see Scott R.
Peppet, Contract Formation in Imperfect Markets: Should We Use Mediators In Deals?,
19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 283, 335 (2004)), and the lawyer's lack of creativity (see
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral:
Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMPLE L. REV. 785, 801-02 (1999);
Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics
and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 269, 366 (1999)).
23 Other explanations-although less plausible in my view-are that the brokerage
industry has an "under siege" mentality due to a recent spike in regulatory activity, and
thus industry parties are less willing to settle arbitration cases, and/or that a certain
segment of customers' lawyers are new to the field and do not understand settlement
dynamics unique to securities arbitrations. Chuck Austin, current President of PIABA,
offered these two reasons at PLI's Securities Arbitration 2004 Program, New York, N.Y.
(August 11, 2004) (author's notes on file). Austin also questioned whether customer
lawyers who had "postured" to prospective clients regarding the strength of their case to
persuade the client to hire them then had difficulty switching gears and convincing the
client that there were weaknesses in the case sufficient to justify a settlement. Id. NASD-
DR statistics and its staff's anecdotal experience do not support these hypotheses.
Interview with Kenneth Andrichik, Senior Vice President, Director of Mediation and
Business Strategies, NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc., in N.Y., N.Y. (September 24,
2004).
24 Some readers might wonder why it is even necessary to make a case for the
appeal of mediation. Those readers might wonder why a disputing party would not be
willing to try mediation. In my experience, however, many parties and/or counsel to
securities disputes think mediation is a waste of time, are reluctant to try an unfamiliar
process, fear the settlement pressures of a directive mediator, are not knowledgeable
about the amount of party control, and/or believe that mediation is simply another tool of
the adversary to extract an advantage for the inevitable arbitration. As a result, it remains
necessary to make the case for mediation. See Philip S. Cottone, Top Ten Specious
Reasons Why Securities Lawyers Won't Mediate, PIABA B.J., Fall 2004, at 73
(debunking reasons).
25 One scholar recently wrote of the need to examine procedural and substantive
justice in dispute resolution processes, as she claims most participants in the process
concentrate primarily on resolution. Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in
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Recent articles suggest that securities arbitration is better for the investor
than litigation, 26 but virtually no literature analyzes the fairness of mediation
of customer disputes. This paper will seek to fill that gap, exploring the
development of securities mediation as a dispute resolution mechanism for
investors.
Part I of this article will provide a brief history of ADR in the securities
industry (primarily arbitration), and then will describe the emergence of
mediation as an alternative to arbitration.
Part II will explore the state and federal statutory regulations that
arguably govern the securities mediation process, and their impact on
procedural and substantive justice.27 In particular, this section will review the
applicability to and impact on securities mediation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act),28 the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 29
and state mediation statutes, including the Uniform Mediation Act.30 In this
section, I will argue that the 1934 Act imposes a sufficient level of oversight
over mediation to increase its fairness without interfering with its flexibility.
I will then demonstrate that the FAA does not apply to mediation. Courts that
hold otherwise are imposing an unnecessary layer of regulation over the
process, threatening to erode its advantages. I will also argue that state
mediation laws are either harmonious with or preempted by forum rules.
Finally, Part III will analyze numerous dimensions of fairness as they
apply to securities mediation, such as party choice, legal and procedural
justice, substantive outcome, and achievement of non-legal goals. This part
of the paper will identify mediation's advantages to the investor, including
efficiency, lower cost, and procedural justice (advantages previously cited in
connection with arbitration), as well as some of its disadvantages, including
the lack. of finality, the lack of discovery, and the potential need for
compromise of what investors might be legally entitled to in other forums. In
Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49,
49-50 (2004).
26 Black & Gross, supra note 2; Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Arbitration: Better for
Investors Than The Courts?, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1503, 1505-06 (1996).
27 Scholars have not reached a consensus on how to measure justice in mediation, or
even how to define "justice" in this context. See infra notes 218-21 and accompanying
text.
28 The specific provisions at issue are those that provide the Securities and Exchange
Commission with oversight authority over self-regulatory organizations. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78s (2004).
29 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2004).
30 The full text of the UMA is posted on the website of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/2003finaldrafthtm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
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this part, I conclude that, as measured by these dimensions, securities
mediation is a fair method of dispute resolution for the individual investor,
and is a viable alternative to arbitration.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ADR IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
A. Securities Arbitration: Fair Yet Litigious
Alternative dispute resolution in the securities industry dates back to the
founding of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in the late 1790s, when
NYSE clerks ruled on disputes over mismatched trades.3 1 In 1817, the NYSE
started using internal arbitration to resolve disputes between members,32 and
in 1872 expanded its use to disputes between consenting customers and
member firms.33 In 1935, the newly created Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) recommended to Congress that the NYSE offer an
independent arbitral tribunal for customer cases.34 However, from 1935 until
31 Known as "out-trades," these were trades in which, during the trade settlement
process, a buy order did not match a sell order, either in price, number of shares, or
accrued interest. See Henry C. Lucas, Jr. et al., Information Technology and the New York
Stock Exchange's Strategic Resources from 1982-1999, #CIS-2002-08, CIS Working
Papers Series (May 2002), available at
http://cisnet.baruch.cuny.edu/papers/cis200208.pdf; see also James Beckley, Embracing
Irrationality: A Functional Test for Vacating Arbitration Awards, in 2 SECURrTIES
ARBITRATION 1998, at 537, 539 (David E. Robbins, Chair, PLI 1998) ("Limited judicial
review of arbitral awards is a hangover from the earlier simpler days under the
Buttonwood Tree where members of the exchange ruled on out-trades.").
32 ROBBINS, supra note 21, § 3-10. The NYSE Constitution of 1817 provided that
"All Questions of dispute in the purchase of stocks shall be decided by a majority of the
Board." Edward W. Morris, Jr., Deborah Masucci & Robert S. Clemente, Securities
Arbitration at Self Regulatory Organizations: New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Administration and Procedure, in 1
SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1992, at 141 (David E. Robbins, Chair, PLI 1992).
33 Id. Subsequent amendments provided for the resolution of all member disputes in
arbitration and in places other than New York City. Id.
34 See Letter from Joseph P. Kennedy, Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission letter to Richard Whitney, NYSE
President, Exchange Act Release No. 34, 131, (1935 WL 29028, at *3) (Mar. 21, 1935).
At first, the NYSE responded that the customer could elect to go to court in lieu of
arbitration before the Exchange. The SEC replied that the NYSE could circumvent this
election by "encourage[ing] its members to offer customers a standard arbitration
agreement requiring that resort be had to arbitration at the election of either the customer
or the member, and providing for arbitration before independent arbitral tribunals at the
election of the customer." Id.
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the 1960s, very few customer disputes ended up in litigation or arbitration.35
In the 1960s, following a successful attempt by a firm to compel
arbitration of a NYSE customer dispute, 36 brokerage firms started
enforcing-against their customers' wishes-previously ignored pre-dispute
arbitration agreements (PDAAs) in their customer contracts. 37 The NASD, a
self-regulatory organization (SRO) that was growing in size and importance
to the industry, adopted its first Code of Arbitration Procedure in 1968,
providing an alternative to the NYSE for the arbitration of customer
disputes. 38 To increase the use of arbitration, the securities SROs further
developed their arbitration procedures through the 1970s and 1980s,39 and
the securities industry resisted challenges by customers to the enforceability
of PDAAs.40 In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court agreed with the industry,
reversed long-standing precedent, 41 and held that federal securities claims
arising out of customer account agreements were arbitrable. 42
Following these Supreme Court decisions, most customer disputes with
their broker-dealers have been resolved in an arbitration forum sponsored by
a securities SRO--either NASD-DR or the NYSE Arbitration Department.43
While securities arbitration is still touted as an inexpensive, efficient and fair
dispute resolution mechanism for disputes between customers and brokers,44
35 ROBBINS, supra note 21, § 3-10.
36 See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache, 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966). The firm
prevailed in the arbitration as well.
37 Morris, Masucci & Clemente, supra note 32, at 141.
38 See Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration-A Success Story: What Does The
Future Hold?, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 183, 185 (1996).
39 See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53
FORDHAM L. REv. 279, 283-84 (1984); Norman S. Poser, Making Securities Arbitration
Work, 50 SMU L. REv. 277, 280-87 (1996); see also Black & Gross, supra note 2, at
998-1005 (discussing development of arbitration procedures).
40 See NYSE Symposium, supra note 4, at 1511-12, 1517-18 (discussing securities
industry's support for enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in brokerage
account agreements); see also Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The
Brave New World of Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1095, 1097 (1993)
(noting that the "securities industry fought persistently for mandatory arbitration").
41 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
42 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). For a more in-depth
discussion of the reasons behind the Supreme Court's overruling of Wilko, see Black &
Gross, supra note 2, at 995-98.
43 See Black & Gross, supra note 2, at 991-92. More than ninety percent of these
arbitrations are conducted in the NASD-DR.
44See Masucci, supra note 38, at 190-200 (discussing benefits of securities
arbitration); Ruder Report, supra note 11, at 1 (finding securities arbitration to be a
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and despite the enactment of many reforms in recent years, criticisms
abound.45 These criticisms include: (1) NASD-DR, as a wholly-owned
subsidiary of NASD, is not independent enough to offer so-called neutral
arbitration services; 46 (2) the consensual nature of arbitration is meaningless
since every brokerage firm in the country requires that customers enter into a
PDAA to open a customer account and, therefore, have no choice but to
submit to arbitration;47 (3) brokerage firms, as repeat players in the
arbitration forum, have a competitive advantage over investors; 48 and (4) the
presence of arbitrators on panels affiliated with the securities industry in
some capacity reduces the panels' neutrality.49 Some scholars and forum
"relatively efficient, fair, and less costly forum for resolution of disputes involving public
investors, member firms, and firm employees" but also stating "that many areas for
improvement of the system exist"); Securities Industry Association, Arbitration Is Fair,
Fast and Economical for Investors (Jan. 29, 2004),
http://www.sia.com/press/pdf/ArbitrationTalkingPoints2003.pdf.
45 See, e.g., Richard Karp, Hardball, BARRON'S, Oct. 20, 2003 (stating that
"securities arbitration cases are surging-and turning nasty"); Gary Weiss, Walled Off
From Justice?, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 22, 2004, at 90-92 (reporting on difficulties
investors face in securing awards from arbitration panels); Ruder Report, supra note 11,
at 7-11 (reporting that the "increasingly litigious nature of securities arbitration has
gradually eroded the advantages of SRO arbitration" and recommending numerous
reforms).
46 See Rachel McTague, Mass. Securities Director Critiques NASD, Says Industry
Bias Seen in Arbitration Forum, SEC. L. DAILY, July 21, 2004 (reporting that the Director
of Massachusetts Securities Division urged that securities arbitrations be run by an
independent entity).
47 See, e.g., Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is Due?, 39
HARV. J. ON LEGis. 281, 290 (2002) (arguing that mandatory arbitration is unfair);
Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62
BROOK. L. REv. 1335, 1339 (1996) (arguing for increased SEC oversight of securities
arbitration due to the decline of consent by investors). It is beyond the scope of this paper
to explore the significance of the lack of customer consent to the arbitration clause.
48 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative
Judicial Systems? Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RES. 19, 50-52
(1999); Richard A. Voytas, Jr., Empirical Evidence of Worsening. Conditions for the
Investor in Securities Arbitration, 12 SECuRITEs ARBITRATION COMMENTATOR 7 (2002).
49 See Charles Gasparino, Judging Wall Street, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 2004, at 56
(reporting that certain claimants' lawyers are criticizing the fairness of securities
arbitration due to the presence of arbitrators on panels who also serve frequently as
mediators, and are compensated by brokerage firms and thus face a conflict of interest);
Michael A. Perino, Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission Regarding
Arbitrator Conflict Disclosure Requirements in NASD and NYSE Securities Arbitrations
(Nov. 4, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/pdf/arbconflict.pdf [hereinafter Perino Report]
(reporting that critics of securities arbitrations "consistently point to the presence of
industry arbitrators on arbitration panels and the classification of arbitrators as public or
338
[Vol. 21:2 2006]
SECURITIES MEDIATION
representatives disagree, arguing that securities arbitration is fair to
investors. 50 These conflicting views came to a head at recent Congressional
hearings on the subject of the fairness of securities arbitration.51 In the
meantime, investors and industry alike continued the search for
alternatives. 52
non-public as the primary sources of potential pro-industry bias"). But see U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GGD-92-74, SECuRriEs ARBITRATION: How INVESTORS
FARE 6-9 (1992) (finding no pro-industry bias in securities arbitration) [hereinafter GAO
1992 REPORT].
50See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GGD-00-115, SECURITIES
ARBITRATION: ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS PROBLEMS OF UNPAID AWARDS 4 (2000)
(stating that there was no basis to make any conclusions about the fairness of SRO
arbitration proceedings); Barbara Black, The Eighth James D. Hopkins Lecture: Is
Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 25 PACE L. REv. 1 (2004) (concluding that
securities arbitration is a fair alternative to courts for investors, and examining procedural
due process components and finding no inherent unfairness); Black & Gross, supra note
2, at 1035-47 (arguing that investors fare better in arbitration because the law is anti-
investor); Robert S. Clemente & Karen Kupersmith, Pillars of Civilization: Attorneys and
Arbitration, 4 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. & TAX L.F. 77, 92 (1999) (arguing that securities
arbitration "has proven its worth and value"); George H. Friedman, The Level Playing
Field, 11 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 12 (2001); David S. Ruder, Elements of a Fair and
Efficient Securities Arbitration System, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 1101, 1108 (1998) (arguing that
securities arbitration "provides clear and significant advantages over the civil litigation
system"); Gary Tidwell et al., Party Evaluation of Arbitrators: An Analysis of Data
Collected From NASD Regulation Arbitrations, Presented to National Meeting, Academy
of Legal Studies in Business (Aug. 5, 1999),
http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/medarb/documents/mediation arbitration/nasdw_009
528.pdf (concluding that 93.49% of participants in securities arbitration felt their "cases
had been handled fairly and without bias").
51 See A Review of the Securities Arbitration System: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H.
Financial Servs. Comm., 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://fmancialservices.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing362&comm=
1. Speakers included representatives of the NASD and NYSE arbitration forums and the
securities industry, investors' advocates, and academics.
52 Following a recent recommendation to the SEC that the SROs sponsor
independent research to "resolve any lingering concerns about pro-industry bias" in
securities arbitration, the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration is currently
sponsoring an empirical study of perceptions of fairness of SRO arbitration. Perino
Report, supra note 49, at 5
To date, available empirical evidence, particularly with respect to investor
perceptions of the arbitration process, is fairly limited and only suggests that there
are no substantial systemic problems in SRO arbitrations. As a result, this Report
recommends that the SROs sponsor additional independent studies to further
evaluate the impartiality of the SRO arbitration process.
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B. The Emergence of Mediation as a Dispute Resolution Process in the
Securities Industry5 3
In 1989, the securities industry introduced mediation as a mechanism to
resolve customer disputes.54 At that time, the commercial and insurance
industries were increasingly using mediation and its success stimulated
interest for the securities industry.55 Additionally, NASD's arbitration
department was facing a rising caseload and a more formal and litigious
arbitration process. 56 As a result, disputants expressed a "renewed interest in
alternative forms of dispute resolution that would recapture the informal,
low-cost, time-saving advantages that arbitration once provided. ' '57
At first, through two pilot programs, NASD58 partnered with outside
dispute resolution companies that already had been providing securities
mediation services. 59 NASD found that participation in those experimental
53 For a brief history of mediation use generally, see KOVACH, supra note 10, at 28-
34. While mediation has been around since biblical times, modem mediation has been
growing in popularity in the United States since 1976. Id. at 1, 31-34.
54 Kenneth Andrichik has been the principal individual at NASD responsible for the
development of mediation as a viable dispute resolution process other than arbitration
offered by NASD to its members. In particular, he felt that there was a more constructive
role for lawyers to represent parties in mediation as opposed to arbitration. Interview with
Kenneth Andrichik, supra note 23.
55 See NASD Notice to Members 95-1, supra note 12, at 1.
56 Id.; SEC Approves New NASD Mediation Rules That Take Effect August 1,
1995, NASD Notice to Members 95-62, at 1 (July 1995) [hereinafter NASD Notice to
Members 95-62] ("The NASD hopes that a mediation program will help to relieve the
weight of this growing number of arbitration cases"); see also Black & Gross, supra note
2, at 998-1005 (describing the evolution of the increasingly litigious nature of securities
arbitration through the 1990s).
57 NASD Notice to Members 95-62, supra note 56, at 1.
58 Other exchanges and SROs also experimented with mediation services at this
time. The National Futures Association started providing some mediation services for its
members in 1989. Ruder Report, supra note 11, at 48. The American Stock Exchange,
before it merged its arbitration services with NASD, launched its own mediation pilot
program in May 1991, using ENDISPUTE, Inc. as its mediation service provider. That
program was also unsuccessful. See W. REECE BADER, SECURITIEs ARBITRATION:
PRACTICE AND FORMS § 12.02 (2003).
59 See GAO 1992 REPORT, supra note 49, at Appendix II. NASD first partnered with
the American Arbitration Association, which had been providing mediation services
since 1983, and U.S. Arbitration and Mediation, Inc. In 1991, NASD added JUDICATE,
the National Private Court System, as a third mediation service provider. See BADER,
supra note 58, § 12.02. Those forums did not use any specialized procedures or rules for
securities mediation; instead they just offered the same mediation services they offered to
customers in other types of disputes. The only perk that these providers offered to
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programs was not as high as it had hoped, and its settlement rate was
somewhat lower than other industries had experienced. 60 These early. pilot
programs did, however, serve to increase awareness of mediation as a viable
alternative to arbitration. 61 And, while repeat players in securities arbitration
resisted a new and different dispute resolution process, they did not reject the
idea of mediation altogether.62 Instead, eligible participants expressed the
view that NASD should develop its own in-house mediation program, so that
disputants would not have to experience the awkward "hand-off' from
NASD to an external company.63
After analyzing the history and current market for mediation programs,
NASD's National Arbitration Committee (NAG) 64 recommended that NASD
establish an internal mediation program to resolve securities disputes.65 In
early 1995, NASD solicited comments on its draft mediation procedures and
the structure and provisions of the mediation program proposed by the
NAC. 66 On June 6, 1995, after revising the proposal based on comments
received during the comment period67 and "further internal NASD review,"
NASD filed a proposed rule change with the SEC to amend the NASD Code
of Arbitration Procedure to add provisions to govern the administration of
mediation and solicited public comment on the proposal. 68 The SEC received
securities industry participants was an advantageous pricing structure. Furthermore,
NASD's role was as a conduit, merely referring interested parties to these external
mediation forums. Interview with Kenneth Andrichik, supra note 23.
60 One report indicates that, of the 230 cases identified as appropriate for referral to
mediation during the NASD pilot program, in only 55 did the parties consent to engage in
mediation, only 16 cases ended up in a mediation session, and only six of those settled.
BADER, supra note 58, § 12.02.
61 See Ruder Report, supra note 11, at 48 n.77 (characterizing "[e]arly experiences
with the pilot" as "very positive").
62 Interview with Kenneth Andrichik, supra note 23.
63 BADER, supra note 58, § 12.02; Interview with Kenneth Andrichik, supra note 23.
64 It is now known as the National Arbitration and Mediation Committee.
65 NASD Notice to Members 95-1, supra note 12, at 1-2. NAC's mediation
subcommittee, made up of individuals experienced in commercial mediation as well as
securities arbitration, developed original mediation rules, although they were based in
part on the rules of other mediation service providers.
66 Id.
67 NASD received five comment letters, all of which generally favored the proposed
rule, but suggested alterations in the proposed Mediation Rules. See Self-Regulatory
Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc., Relating to Mediation of Disputes, Exchange Act Release No.
34-35830, 60 Fed. Reg. 31,522, 31,526 (June 15, 1995).
68 See id. at 31,524.
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no public comments, and approved the proposed rule change on July 19,
1995 to take effect August 1, 1995.69
As adopted, NASD's mediation rules:70 (1) establish the general scope
and authority of the mediation rules; 71 (2) designate a Director of Mediation
to administer the Rules;72 (3) preclude a mediator or the NASD from
compelling a party to submit to mediation or to settle at mediation,
confirming the voluntary nature of the process; 73 (4) provide that the filing of
a mediation will not stay the arbitration of the same dispute already pending
so as to "prevent the use of mediation as a delaying tactic;" 74 (5) provide for
the appointment and selection of mediators;75 (6) provide mediators with
immunity; 76(7) set forth "Ground Rules" for the mediation itself;77 (8) set
forth payment and fee-schedules; 78 and (9) prohibit the maintenance of a
verbatim record of a mediation session, so as to promote a free-flowing and
confidential exchange of views, opinions, proposals and admissions. 79
Except for one modification to the postponement fee and a current proposed
rule change to reorganize, renumber and simplify the language of the
mediation code, 80 the NASD mediation rules have not changed in substance
since they were enacted. 81 These forum rules effectively guide the parties
69 See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Mediation of Disputes,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-35990, 59 SEC Docket 2054 (July 19, 1995).
70National Association of Securities Dealers Manual, Code of Arbitration
Procedure, Rule 10400 Series (2005) [hereinafter NASD Rules].
71 NASD Rules 10401(a), 10402 (2005).
72 NASD Rule 10401(b) (2005).
73 NASD Rule 10401(c) (2005).
74 NASD Rule 10403 (2005).
75 NASD Rule 10404 (2005).
76 NASD Rule 10405 (2005).
77 NASD Rule 10406 (2005). See infra notes 275-81 and accompanying text for a
more detailed description of these Ground Rules.
78 NASD Rule 10407 (2005).
79 NASD Rule 10326(b) (2005).
80 See Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc.; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 Thereto to
Amend NASD Arbitration Rules for Mediation Proceedings, SEC Release No. 34-51855,
File No. SR-NASD-2004-013, 70 Fed. Reg. 36440 (proposed June 23, 2005). The filing
does not propose any substantive changes to the mediation rules, but proposes separating
the rules from the Code of Arbitration Procedure into its own Code of Mediation
Procedure.
81 Mediation: An Alternate Path, supra note 10.
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through the process and set some minimal parameters, without provoking a
call for additional rules.
The use of mediation as a dispute resolution process in securities
disputes steadily rose in the late 1990s.82 Currently NASD-DR handles the
vast majority of these cases; NYSE, 83 AAA, JAMS, and private mediators
each handle a small number of the remaining cases. In its first full year,
1996, NASD-DR mediated 512 cases. By 2003, this number had increased to
1,889 cases-with an average turnaround time of 118 days.84 In the first
quarter of 2004, NASD-DR reached the milestone of mediating case number
10,000 since it started in-house mediation in 1995. The cumulative
settlement rate for those 10,000 cases is 80%.85 NASD's efforts also
increased the diversity of ADR methods available to the parties with their
consent and thus reduced the criticisms leveled at the mandatory nature of
PDAA arbitrations.
Party evaluations of the securities mediation procedures, as well as the
mediator and the staff are extremely positive and overwhelmingly report on
82 The Ruder Report was a strong catalyst for the expansion of securities mediation.
Reporting "very encouraging" results from the program in the short time period between
August 1, 1995 and November 30, 1995, the Ruder Task Force recommended that NASD
expand its mediation program by encouraging parties to participate in mediation, training
additional mediators, and hiring additional mediation staff. Ruder Report, supra note 11,
at 47, 50, 54-56. Although the Task Force considered a recommendation that NASD
compel participation of parties in mediation, it ultimately declined to adopt that
recommendation. Id. at54-55.
83 The NYSE started a subsidized, mandatory mediation program in 1998, but only
for industry disputes over $500,000. The scope of covered cases expanded in 2002 for
claims over $250,000, but this program effectively expired in 2003 when NYSE amended
its mediation rules. After that, mediation at NYSE became entirely voluntary and requires
the parties to bear their own expenses. See NYSE Information Memo 03-04, Arbitration:
Administrative Conferences and Mediation (Feb. 25, 2003),
http://apps.nyse.com/commdata/PublnfoMemos.nsf/AllPublishedlnfoMemosNyseCom/8
5256A71006FB86385256C620065859E/$FILE/Microsoft%2OWord%20-
%20Document0/o20in%2003-4.pdf. While NYSE, like NASD-DR, will provide
requesting parties with a list of mediators, NYSE, unlike NASD-DR, offers no financial
incentive to parties to postpone an arbitration hearing to attempt resolution through
mediation.
84 BADER, supra note 58, § 12.02.
85 Interview with Kenneth Andrichik, supra note 23; see also Securities Arbitration
Alert 2004-20 (May 19, 2004) (reporting that NASD-DR currently claims that more than
80% of disputes submitted to mediation result in a settlement agreement). Mr. Andrichik
noted that mediation is most likely to be successful if the parties submit to mediation
when the right type of case is ripe for the process and the parties carefully select an
appropriate mediator.
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the benefits of the process. 86 In January 2000, NASD-DR implemented a
(non-scientific) survey of mediation participants to gauge their reaction to the
mediation program. After gathering 635 completed and returned surveys, the
NASD-DR staff wrote a summary report that reflected an extremely high
level of satisfaction of participants with the process. 87
Attorneys representing parties in securities mediation also praise the
process. David Robbins, a leading practitioner in the securities dispute
resolution field, writes that "[m]ost practitioners who have participated in the
mediation of a securities dispute are pleasantly surprised with the intelligence
of the process, the pragmatism of the mediator and the reasonableness of the
result. Speaking to them of the advantages of mediation is preaching to the
converted."'88 As he observes, "[m]ediation is to arbitration as arbitration is to
litigation. That is, as arbitration-touted as the expeditious, cost-effective
alternative to litigation-becomes more like litigation, an alternative to that
alternative has emerged to itself become the expeditious, cost-effective
alternative to arbitration." 89
However, party evaluations collected on an informal basis combined
with anecdotal reports of attorney satisfaction certainly do not establish that a
dispute resolution mechanism is fair. The remainder of this paper will
explore-in a more systematic fashion-the factors that impact on the
fairness of securities mediation.
II. STATUTORY REGULATION OF SECURITIES MEDIATION
One way to assure some level of fairness in a dispute resolution process
is to regulate it.90 Modem securities mediation has the unique distinction of
being regulated at the forum, federal, and state levels. First, the SRO
mediation forums must be concerned with fairness, because one of their
primary roles under their enabling legislation, the 1934 Act, is to protect
86 NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc., Mediation Survey (2003) (on file with author).
87 Id. For example, 93% of participants in mediations that ended in a settlement
reported that they felt the mediator was fair and unbiased, and 84% of these participants
were satisfied with the mediation process. For mediations that did not result in a
settlement, 81% of participants classified as claimants and 89% of participants classified
as respondents reported that the mediator was fair and unbiased. Id.
88 ROBBINS, supra note 21, § 16-1. The entirety of chapter 16 of Robbins' well-
known treatise provides a detailed description of securities mediation.
89 Id.
90 SARAH R. COLE, CRAIG A. McEwEN & NANCY H. ROGERS, MEDIATION: LAW,
POLICY & PRACTICE § 2:1 (2d ed. 2003) (stating that "legal regulation of mediation
aspires to achieve fairness, effectiveness, quality and access" but also noting that "goals
for legal regulation of mediation often conflict").
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investors. 91 Second, SEC oversight of these forums adds a federal layer of
regulation.92 Third, state mediation statutes add a regulatory layer, although
state mediation law tends to be consistent with-or else preempted by-
federal law.93While regulation seems unavoidable, our legal system's choices as to the
quantity and methods of regulation of a dispute resolution process will have
an impact on its success. 94 For this reason, any additional regulation over and
above the sources identified above would be extraneous and inhibiting. Yet,
recent judicial trends suggest that courts could stretch the FAA to cover
securities mediation-adding an unwarranted layer of federal law.95 In this
section, I explore these multiple layers of regulation of securities mediation
that simultaneously attempt to insure the integrity and fairness of the process
and threaten to inhibit its flexibility.
A. Federal Regulation
1. SEC Oversight
The 1934 Act96 established a complex scheme to regulate and maintain
capital markets as well as to protect the investing public. It also created the
SEC to administer the Act and oversee its regulations. 97 Under the 1934 Act,
44a major portion of the day-to-day regulation of broker-dealers and
associated persons with them were left to SROs subject to SEC
supervision." 98 Since virtually all broker-dealers are members of NASD, "no
broker-dealer can escape the self-regulatory system."99 In 1975, Congress
amended the 1934 Act by authorizing the SEC to, inter alia, review all
91 See Poser, supra note 40, at 1097 (noting that the Exchange Act has the "explicit
goal of protecting investors").
92 See infra Part II.A. 1.
93 See infra Part Il.B.
94 See Stemlight, supra note 16, at 296 (recognizing that "[w]e must also make
choices as to how to regulate these various forms of dispute resolution").
95 See infra Part II.A.2.
96 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2005).
97 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2005).
9 8 NORMAN POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION § 13.01 (3d ed. 2004).
The Maloney Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1070, codified as Section 15A of the 1934 Act,
amended the federal securities laws to permit qualified associations of broker-dealers to
register with the SEC as national securities associations. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2005). The NASD is the only national securities association
registered pursuant to this provision. Id.
99 POSER, supra note 98, § 13.01.
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proposed SRO rules.' 00 Thus, SROs, NASD and NYSE must file with the
SEC any change they propose in their own rules, including arbitration and
mediation rules,10' and await SEC approval. 10 2
The Supreme Court has used this SEC oversight to justify the mandatory
nature of arbitration with respect to customer disputes, at least those arising
under the federal securities laws. 10 3 When the Court in McMahon first
abrogated prior law by holding that investors' federal securities law claims
were arbitrable, 1°4 it noted that the 1975 amendments to the 1934 Act gave
the Commission new and "expansive power to ensure the adequacy of the
arbitration procedures employed by the SROs."'10 5 This power includes the
authority to "mandate the adoption of any rules it deems necessary to ensure
that arbitration procedures adequately protect statutory rights."'1 6 The Court
thus reasoned, that because SEC oversight of SRO arbitration adequately
100 Prior legislation authorized the SEC to review or modify only a narrower set of
SRO rules. See id.
101 Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Securities Arbitration, 62 BROOK.
L. REv. 1459, 1465 (1996) (stating that the "SEC has statutory authority to influence
securities arbitration" under section 19 of the 1934 Act); David S. Ruder, Securities
Arbitration in the Public Interest: The Role of Punitive Damages, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 69,
72 (1997) (noting that "the Commission has broad authority to oversee and to regulate the
rules adopted by the SROs relating to customer disputes, including the power to mandate
the adoption of any rules it deems necessary to ensure that arbitration procedures
adequately protect statutory rights"). For examples of SEC review of NASD-DR
procedural rule changes, see, e.g., NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc., 2005 NASD Dispute
Resolution Rule Filings,
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&nodeld=l 186 (last
visited Nov. 3, 2005).
102 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (2004) ("Each self-
regulatory organization shall file with the Commission, in accordance with such rules as
the Commission may prescribe, copies of any proposed rule or any proposed change in,
addition to, or deletion from the rules of such self-regulatory
organization... accompanied by a concise general statement of the basis and purpose of
such proposed rule change."). The SEC then publishes the proposed rule change, gives
"interested persons" an opportunity to comment on the proposal and, following the public
comment period, approves the rule change if it finds that it "is consistent with the
requirements of [the '34] Act and the rules and regulations thereunder," including the
requirement that the rule protect investors and the public interest. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78f(b)(5), 78o-3(b)(6) (2005), for a National Securities Exchange and a Registered
Securities Association, respectively.
103 See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 234-35 (1987).
104 Id. at 233-34.
10 5 Id. at 233.
106 Id. at 234.
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protects investors, arbitration would not deprive investors of the means to
enforce their rights under the 1934 Act. 107
The 1975 Amendments to the 1934 Act added an indispensable layer of
statutory regulation over SRO arbitration as well as mediation with the
express statutory purpose of enhancing investor protection.10 8 In theory, this
"public interest" model of mediation'0 9 carries with it the constant threat of
regulatory intervention. In reality, however, the threat of oversight has not
translated into anything more than minimal intervention by the SEC.110 No
public comments were received when the SEC published for comment
NASD's proposed mediation rules,' 1i and the SEC approved them "as is."
Similarly, the SEC has approved easily (albeit sometimes quite slowly) the
SROs' proposed changes to their arbitration rules, especially if the rule
appears to judicialize the procedure so as to ensure investor protection. 112
Moreover, since there have been no substantive mediation rule changes since
the SROs' internal programs began, the SEC has had little opportunity to
review the mediation process. The SEC has neither published nor
commissioned any studies of mediation and it has made no public
pronouncements about mediation.
107 Id. at 231-34.
108 Ruder,. supra note 101, at 74 (stating that the presence of "active SEC oversight
of the SRO arbitration system provides a major distinguishing characteristic between
securities arbitration and other arbitration systems" and that the "oversight is an essential
ingredient in assuring a securities arbitration system in the public interest"); see also
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REv. 931, 1007 (1998) (arguing that "[o]ne could distinguish
securities industry arbitration cases from other types of cases involving arbitration of
statutory claims on the ground that under the Securities Acts, there is a possibility of SEC
oversight of the SROs and their arbitration tribunals, a possibility that does not exist
when violations of other statutory rights are alleged").
109 1 derive this term from Professor Speidel's naming of the "public interest model"
of securities arbitration. He has called for this model due to "the power imbalances
between investors and broker-dealers in a highly regulated industry and the common use
of 'adhesion' contracts .... The reality is that private ordering will not work to neutralize
the investor's lack of choice, the risk of imbalance in the terms of the contract to arbitrate
securities disputes, or the perception that the arbitration process is under industry
control." Richard E. Speidel, Punitive Damages and the Public Interest Model of
Securities Arbitration: A Response to Professor Stipanowich, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 99, 105
(1997); see also Speidel, supra note 47, at 1362-63 (discussing public interest model).
110 Brunet, supra note 101, at 1464-66 (contending that "[t]he past and present
degree of SEC public interest regulation of securities arbitration reveals an ongoing
agency presence but little in the way of regulatory vigor").
111 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
112 Brunet, supra note 101, at 1466.
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At the same time, the rule-making process has not had any adverse
impact on NASD mediation. It seems that the need for SEC approval has
allowed the SROs to maintain the status quo, because rule changes are an
encumbered undertaking and the SROs do not pursue them readily.
Additionally, the SEC has never rejected a mediation-related rule proposal
and NASD has never declined to seek an amendment to its rules because of
the possibility of SEC rejection. 113 If anything, NASD-DR views the SEC
oversight as a value-added feature to the mediation services it provides."14
Nevertheless, even a minimal amount of SEC review of SRO dispute
resolution procedures ensures that "major developments in securities
[mediation] receive some public airing." ' 1 5 The SEC staff does, on a regular
basis, visit NASD-DR for oversight examinations to review its procedures.116
This regulatory layer-which does not exist for most mediation service
providers-should provide some comfort to investors that the SEC's
oversight will ensure a fairer process and should enhance investors'
perceptions that mediation is a fair alternative to arbitration.
2. The Federal Arbitration Act?
Another federal statutory scheme that arguably regulates the securities
mediation process is the Federal Arbitration Act. 117 The far-reaching
implications of a recent federal decision applying the FAA to mediation' 18
_
enabling greatly enhanced judicial intervention in many phases of the
process-warrant a detailed examination of this suspect holding. 119
113 Interview with Kenneth Andrichik, supra note 23.
S114Id.
115 Brunet, supra note 101, at 1484.
116 Interview with Kenneth Andrichik, supra note 23.
117 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2005). The Supreme Court has made it clear that the FAA
applies to securities brokerage agreements containing a PDAA. Howsam v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002) (applying FAA to securities arbitration).
118 Fisher v. GE Med. Sys., 276 F. Supp. 2d 891 (M.D. Tenn. 2003).
119 It has been suggested to me that a court could find that section two of the FAA
applies to mediation proceedings, thus making agreements to mediate future disputes
enforceable, but that the procedural devices specified in the other sections of the FAA do
not apply to mediation. Under this scenario, the finding that section two covered
mediation would not be nearly as troubling. I reject this suggestion as implausible.
Besides the interpretive hoops one must jump through to justify a conclusion that
"arbitration" has different meanings in different sections of the same Act, a primary
legislative purpose of the procedures in sections 3-16 was to give the parties devices to
enforce the substantive rights granted by section two. A conclusion that section two
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The FAA, adopted by Congress in 1925,120 regulates and enforces
arbitration agreements that fall within its scope. For any dispute that is
governed by the FAA, the parties gain access to certain procedural devices,
including the right to move to stay litigation when the dispute is covered by
an enforceable arbitration agreement, 121 move to compel an adverse party to
comply with an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, 122 move to confirm an
arbitration award and reduce it to an enforceable judgment, 123 move to vacate
or modify an arbitration award under certain limited grounds, 124 and appeal
from rulings under the FAA. 125 In addition, the FAA grants subpoena power
to the arbitrators to secure attendance of witnesses or production of
documents at the hearing. 126
But what types of written provisions are within the FAA's scope? The
central substantive section of the FAA, section 2, reads:
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction... shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 127 The Supreme Court has
written, that as embodied in this section, the primary purpose of the FAA
was to overcome the courts' common law refusal to enforce agreements to
arbitrate. 12 8 The legislative history also suggests that at least one additional
deemed mediation agreements enforceable as a matter of substantive federal law but that
the FAA provided no means to enforce this law seems illogical.
120 United States Arbitration Act, P.L. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925).
121 9 U.S.C. § 3.
122 9 U.S.C. § 4.
123 9 U.S.C. § 9.
124 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11.
125 9 U.S.C. § 16.
126 9 U.S.C. § 7.
127 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
128 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985); see also
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). This conclusion is supported by both
the House and Senate Reports supporting the bill. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)
(stating that "[t]he purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforcible [sic] agreements for
arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce"); S. REP. No. 68-536, at
2 (1924) (stating that the purpose of the bill is "clearly set forth in section 2," the section
making agreements to arbitrate irrevocable). The Senate report explained that courts
refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate for three reasons: (1) fear that the arbitration
tribunal lacked the means to give full or proper redress as well as a belief they lacked the
authority to compel a party to submit his cause to arbitration thus denying his right to a
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purpose of the bill was to expedite legal claims, lower their costs and place
arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts. 12 9
Because the FAA does not define the term "arbitration,"'130 courts have
grappled with its meaning.' 3 ' While the Supreme Court has never addressed
whether the FAA applies to agreements for non-binding dispute resolution,
many lower federal 13 2 and state courts 133 have held that only dispute
court of justice; (2) fear courts would be ousted of much of their jurisdiction; and (3)
established precedent. Id. at 2-3.
129 The Supreme Court wrote:
This is not to say that Congress was blind to the potential benefit of the legislation
for expedited resolution of disputes. Far from it, the House Report expressly
observes:
"It is practically appropriate that the action should be taken at this time when
there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation. These
matters can be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration
agreements are made valid and enforceable."
Byrd, 470 U.S. at 220; S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (stating that Congress' motivation
in enacting the FAA was a "desire to avoid the delay and expense of litigation" and
noting that the "settlement of tlisputes by arbitration appeals to big business and little
business alike, to corporate interests as well as to individuals").
130 Section 1 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1, defines certain terms used in the Act but'
conspicuously omits the definition of "arbitration." Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Bank
Trust Nat'l Assn., 218 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Curiously, the FAA does not
define 'arbitration."'); Fisher v. GE Med. Sys., 276 F. Supp. 2d 891, 893 (M.D. Tenn.
2003) ("The FAA does not precisely define what processes constitute 'arbitration."'). The
analysis in this section applies equally to suspect applications of the Uniform Arbitration
Act (UAA) and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) to mediation, as those
Acts were patterned after the FAA and contain the identical non-definition of
"arbitration." See RUAA § 6; UAA § 6.
131 AMF Inc. v. Brunswick, 621 F. Supp. 456, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that
"[a]rbitration is a term that eludes easy definition").
132 E.g., Salt Lake Tribune Pub. Co., LLC. v. Mgmt Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684
(10th Cir. 2004) (holding that appraisal process was not "arbitration" under the FAA); Fit
Tech, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 374 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that
accounting remedy was FAA arbitration because it was binding and final remedy);
Hartford Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Teachworth, 898 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that
insurance appraisal process was not FAA arbitration because it was informal and
determined only amount of loss, not liability of parties).
133 E.g., Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Assocs., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 872
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (defining arbitration as ADR process resulting in a binding decision
by third party); Urology Assocs., P.C. v. CIGNA Healthcare of Tenn., Inc., No. M2001-
022521, 2002 WL 31302922, *7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2002) (holding that
arbitration must be binding to be covered by federal and state arbitration acts); see also
[Vol. 21:2 20061
SECURITIES MEDIATION
resolution processes resulting in a binding andfinal determination qualify as
"arbitration" within the meaning of the FAA.
With increasing frequency, however, some courts are concluding that the
FAA applies to dispute resolution procedures other than binding
arbitration. 134 First, focusing on the word "settle" in section 2 of the FAA
rather than the word "arbitration," some courts have held that non-binding
arbitration is arbitration within the meaning of the Act if it has some potential
to "settle" the controversy. 135 For example, in AMF Inc. v. Brunswick, 621 F.
Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) two competing bowling equipment
manufacturers had previously settled a lawsuit regarding alleged deceptive
advertising practices. The settlement agreement provided that the parties
would settle any future similar controversy through a non-binding advisory
opinion process administered by the National Advertising Division
(NAD). 136 When a subsequent advertising controversy arose, AMF invoked
the advisory opinion process but Brunswick refused to comply. 137
AMF brought an action in federal district court to compel Brunswick's
compliance with the NAD provision of the settlement agreement under
section four of the FAA. Brunswick argued that the FAA covers only binding
arbitration, but not a process through which the end result would be a non-
Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 1242 (Ohio 1992) (ruling that arbitration must
be binding to be "arbitration" under state law); Ohio Council 8, Am. Fed'n of State,
County and Mun. Employees v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities, 459 N.E.2d 220, 222-23 (Ohio 1984) (declining to confirm mediators'
recommendations pursuant to Ohio arbitration rules and concluding that "mediation and
arbitration represent separate and distinct means of attempting to resolve grievances");
Godfrey v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 16 P.3d 617 (Wash. 2001) (refusing to enforce,
pursuant to Washington's arbitration statute, an agreement calling for non-binding
arbitration).
134 See AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 459-61; Shelby v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 03-F-106-N,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26472 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 6, 2003) (compelling non-binding
arbitration under FAA); Allied Sanitation, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., 97 F.
Supp. 2d 320, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that "[t]he concept of arbitration plausibly
embraces all contractual dispute resolution mechanisms, consistent with Congress's
design to foster alternative means to resolving litigation").
135 See AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 461; see also Mortimer v. First Mount Vernon Indus.
Loan Ass'n, No. AMD 03-1051, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24698, *6 (D. Md. 2003)
(enforcing a contract requiring parties to resort to mediation before arbitration or
litigation under the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act because it is an "alternative
method to settle controversies").
136 AMT', 621 F. Supp. at 457. The parties agreed that NAD-a division of the
Council of Better Business Bureaus-would determine whether there was "experimental
support" for the superiority claim. Compliance with an NAD advisory decision was
voluntary but, previously, compliance by advertisers had been 100%. Id. at 458.
137/Id.
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binding, advisory opinion. 138 Instead, Brunswick argued that the FAA
applied only to arbitration processes that provided a true alternative to
litigation in that they resulted in a final settlement of the dispute. 139
The district court disagreed. Noting, that in the labor arbitration field,
some commentators had written that arbitration had become "synonymous
with 'mediation' and 'conciliation."' Chief Judge Weinstein concluded that
"[n]o magic words such as 'arbitrate' or 'binding arbitration' or 'final dispute
resolution' are needed to obtain the benefits of the [FAA]."'1 40 Instead he
found that, because submission of the parties' dispute to NAD would "settle"
the advertising controversy between the parties, the non-binding arbitration
process constituted "arbitration" within the meaning of the FAA. 141
AMf and other courts also have found non-binding arbitration to be
FAA-governed arbitration on the grounds that the parties had agreed to
submit their disputes for resolution to a process other than litigation or made
non-binding arbitration a condition precedent to litigation. 142 For these
138 Id. at 459.
139 Id.
140 Id. Judge Weinstein rested his conclusion on dictum from a 1910 Supreme Court
case, City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co, 218 U.S. 180, 194 (1910), that stated "a plain
case of the submission of a dispute or difference which had to be adjusted.., was in fact
an arbitration, though the arbitrators were called appraisers." AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 459-
60 (quoting from City of Omaha, 218 U.S. at 194). Of course, however, City of Omaha
preceded the passage of the FAA, so the Court could not have been defining "arbitration"
within the meaning of the FAA.
141 AMff, 621 F. Supp. at 460-61. Judge Weinstein also rejected the notion that
arbitration necessarily had to include certain hallmarks such as an "adversary proceeding,
submission of evidence, witnesses and cross-examination." Id. at 460.
142 See Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 1998)
(ruling that non-binding arbitration process was FAA arbitration because parties agreed
to submit dispute to a third party for resolution and agreed not to pursue litigation until
that process was completed); AME, 621 F. Supp. at 461; Homes of Legend v.
McCollough, 776 So.2d 741, 748 (Ala. 2000) (stating that "[t]he FAA... does not
require that an arbitration agreement provide for binding arbitration" and finding that the
court could compel non-binding arbitration under the FAA); Kelly v. Benchmark Homes,
550 N.W.2d 640, 645 (Neb. 1996) (ruling that FAA applied to contract arising out of
interstate commerce that contained a pre-dispute clause requiring non-binding arbitration
as a condition precedent to litigation); Webb v. Am. Employers Group, 684 N.W.2d 33,
41 (Neb. 2004); see also Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 371-72 (3d Cir. 2003)
(concluding that dispute resolution program under Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers' was not FAA arbitration because it was not meant to replace
litigation); Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258, 266 (1st Cir. 1998) (concluding that tenure
grievance procedure giving tenure candidate the right but not obligation to pursue a form
of arbitration was not FAA arbitration because parties could not have a reasonable
expectation that the procedure would resolve the dispute); Harrison v. Nissan Motor
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courts, the non-binding nature of the procedure was not fatal to the
classification of the procedure as FAA arbitration. For example, the AMF
court indicated that the fact that the NAD process "may not end all
controversy between the parties for all times is no reason not to enforce the
agreement. ' 143 Rather, because the NAD process provided an alternative to
litigation, it qualified as arbitration under the FAA.144 As a result, the court
compelled the parties to submit to the NAD process pursuant to section four
of the FAA. 145
Since AMF, several courts have considered the applicability of the FAA
to mediation. In C.B. Richard Ellis, Inc. v. American Environmental Waste
Management,146 the court applied the FAA to a mediation clause, but there,
the parties had already agreed that the FAA applied. 147 In Cecala v.
Moore,148 the court ruled that the FAA did not apply to a contract containing
a mediation clause on the grounds that there was no interstate commerce.
149
Corp., 111 F.3d 343, 349-52 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that parties' agreement to submit
controversies to an informal dispute resolution procedure was not covered by the FAA
because the procedure did not provide for completion of the process as a prerequisite for
litigation); Parisi v. Netleaming, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 751-52 (E.D. Va. 2001)
(concluding that dispute resolution program under Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers' was not FAA arbitration because it was not meant to replace
litigation). In New York, where arbitration laws were a model for the FAA, courts also
have ruled that non-binding arbitration constitutes "arbitration" under the state arbitration
statute. See Citibank N.A. v. Bankers Trust Co., 633 N.Y.S.2d 314 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995) (enforcing agreement to resolve disputes through only partially binding ADR
procedure and staying litigation until after procedure was completed); Bd. of Educ. v.
Cracovia, 321 N.Y.S.2d 496 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971) (holding that New York's arbitration
act covered collective bargaining agreement's provision for non-binding arbitration).
143 AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 461.
144 Id.
145 In any event, the court noted that the dispute resolution provision was
enforceable under New York law, and the court invoked its equitable powers under state
law to compel the parties to submit to the NAD process. Id. As Professor Schmitz has
argued, the court potentially could have avoided application of the FAA by ordering the
parties to participate in the NAD process under doctrines of contract law. Amy S.
Schmitz, Refreshing Contractual Analysis of ADR Agreements By Curing Bipolar
Avoidance of Modern Common Law, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (2004). The
ambiguous law in place at the time in New York regarding specific enforcement of
private ADR agreements may explain the court's circumvention of contract law and
stretch to apply the FAA. Id.
146 No. 98-CV-4183, 1998 WL 903495 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1998).
147 Id. at *2.
148 982 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
149 Id. at 612. The court found that the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act (IUAA)
applied because the dispute arose out of the contract. Id.
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However, the court did not address whether "mediation" is within the
purview of the FAA. In Annapolis Professional Firefighters Local 1926 v.
City of Annapolis,150 the Maryland state court enforced a mediation
agreement under state contract law, but declined to extend the AMF holding
to mediation by enforcing the agreement under the FAA. The court found
that, because mediation is an increasingly favored method of dispute
resolution, it could "see no rational basis for not enforcing agreements to
utilize such methods in much the same manner as agreements to arbitrate are
enforced." 151
In 2003, apparently in a case of first impression, a federal court explicitly
held that the FAA covered an agreement to mediate a dispute. 152 As
mentioned above, 153 the primary differences between mediation and
arbitration are the non-binding nature of mediation, as well as the
involvement of the neutral to help the parties reach a settlement, rather than
to impose a finding. The conclusion that the FAA covered a non-binding
process was not new, but the conclusion that it governed a process not
resulting in a finding by a third party neutral appears novel.
In Fisher v. GE Med. Sys., 276 F. Supp. 2d 891 (M.D. Tenn. 2003),
plaintiffs, former employees of defendant GE, filed a complaint in federal
court alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 154 GE moved to
compel mediation pursuant to an employee dispute resolution program
(called RESOLVE) that was made a condition of employment for all
employees. The program is self-styled as a "written agreement for the
resolution of employment issues, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act."'1 55
The Program involved four levels of an "Issue Resolution Process," the first
two of which were internal, and the third of which required mediation
administered by the American Arbitration Association. If the mediation did
not result in a settlement, then the fourth level permitted employees to take
their claim to court. 156
Plaintiffs argued that the court could not compel the third level of
mediation pursuant to the FAA because it was-not "arbitration." The district
court disagreed, stating that "'arbitration' in the FAA is a broad term that
encompasses many forms of dispute resolution." 157 To buttress its decision,
150 642 A.2d 889 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
151 Id. at 894.
152 See Fisher v. GE Med. Sys., 276 F. Supp. 2d 891 (M.D. Tenn. 2003).
153 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
154 Fisher, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 892.
155 Id. (quoting from Agreement).
156 Id. at 892-93.
157 Id. at 893.
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the Fisher court cited the federal policy of favoring non-judicial resolutions
of labor disputes:
The policy in favor of the finality of arbitration is but one part of a broader
goal of encouraging informal, i.e., non-judicial resolution of labor disputes.
It is not arbitration per se that federal policy favors, but rather final
adjustment of differences by a means selected by the parties. If the parties
agree that a procedure other than arbitration shall provide a conclusive
resolution of their differences, federal labor policy encourages that
procedure no less than arbitration. 158
Also, to define the scope of the term "arbitration," the Fisher court, like
the AMF court, focused on the term "settle" in section two of the FAA.
159
Because the mediation procedure at issue required the parties to mediate
disputes before filing them in court, the district court ruled that the FAA
applied as a matter of federal policy. 160
The legislative history of the FAA does not support the Fisher court's
expansive interpretation of the word "arbitration" in the FAA. Rather, that
history supports the view that Congress intended the Act to govern
traditional, binding arbitration, rather than any non-final, non-binding dispute
resolution process such as mediation. For example, the Senate Report
supporting the bill describes arbitration as a process including a tribunal, a
hearing, counsel, and witnesses. 161 A representative of the Arbitration
Society of America, 162 a proponent of the bill, discussed the advantages of
arbitration, a process in which an arbitrator decides factual and legal issues in
dispute.163
158 Id. (quoting Bakers Union Factory, #326 v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., Inc., 749
F.2d 350, 353 (6th Cir. 1984)).
159 Id. at 893; see also C.B. Richard Ellis, Inc. v. Am. Envtl. Waste Mgmt., No. 98-
CV-4183(JG) 1998 WL 903495, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1998) (holding that, although
the parties had agreed that the FAA governed the dispute, the clause fell under the FAA
"[b]ecause the mediation clause in the case at bar manifests the parties' intent to provide
an alternative method to 'settle'controversies").
160 Fisher, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 894. The court did not focus on the fact that the
mediation might not provide "conclusive resolution" to the parties' controversy. The
court might have been influenced by the fact that the dispute resolution agreement itself
invoked the FAA.
161 S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924).
162 The Arbitration Society was the predecessor organization to the American
Arbitration Association. See IAN MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW:
REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 40-41 (1992).
163 Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings Before the
Subcomms. of the H. and S. Comms. on the Judiciary on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th
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The strongest evidence that Congress did not think it was passing
legislation governing a mediation-like process is testimony regarding the bill
at the Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Congressional
Committees on the Judiciary. Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman of the
Committee on Arbitration for the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New
York, New York City and a sponsor of the bill, 164 testified:
There are four known methods based on long experience I have had by
which to meet trade disputes, the ordinary everyday trade disputes, and it is
for them that this legislation is proposed.
1. For parties to settle between themselves, which is the usual method, an
excellent method.
2. For the parties to settle by negotiation, with the assistance of a third
party, a mutual friend in whom they have confidence. That is the next best
way of doing it.
3. For the parties to enter into a formal arbitration, which is the basis on
which this bill is framed, namely, arbitration which has legal sanction,
whereby arbitration once agreed upon must be seen through, so that the
parties can not, as they can in the most of our States and certainly in
connection with interstate business, back out at the last moment when they
see the case is going against them. That should not be permitted. It is
unmoral, unfair, and untenable.
4. The last method is that of litigation, which is, of course, the worst method
of them all. 16 5
It is clear from this testimony from the primary sponsor of the FAA-
and by someone whose testimony the Supreme Court has considered
informative on the issue of FAA legislative intent in another context 166 -that
mediation (Bernheimer's method number two-using a third party for
Cong. 27 (1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of Alexander Rose, Representing
the Arbitration Society of America, New York City).
164 New York was the first state to enact legislation that called for the enforcement
of arbitration agreements. MACNEIL, supra note 162, at 34-37.
165 Joint Hearings, supra note 163, at 7 (testimony of Charles L. Bernheimer,
Chairman of the Committee on Arbitration of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of
New York).
166 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274 (1995) (citing
Bernheimer's testimony when interpreting meaning in FAA of phrase "involving
commerce"); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Condin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405-406
(1967) (same).
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settlement) was not included under the FAA's enabling legislation. And,
Bernheimer's definition of arbitration as a final process during which the
participants cannot back out before it is completed necessarily precludes the
modem, entirely voluntary process of mediation.
Testimony from Mr. Julius Henry Cohen, member of the Committee on
Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law of the American Bar Association
and primary author of the bill, is also instructive:
Now, I think everybody to-day [sic] feels very strongly that the right of
freedom of contract, which the Constitution guarantees to men, includes the
right to dispose of any controversy which may arise out of the contract in
their own fashion .... In other words, we agree to settle on the terms that
these gentlemen say is proper. And we sign a letter to that effect. 167
This testimony supports the contention that the author of the FAA
intended the law to cover a process that disposes of, or resolves, the
controversy, rather than a process that is not final in its resolution of a
controversy. Mr. Cohen also submitted a brief for the record, in which he
wrote:
The arbitrators are given powers to call witnesses and require the
production of papers, to assure that a full and fair consideration of the
controversy may be had despite the possible recalcitrance of one or more
parties to the dispute. They are required to execute their award with certain
formality, so that there can thereafter be no question with respect either to
its existence or its identity. 168
The process Mr. Cohen described is one in which a third party neutral
imposes a binding resolution of the dispute, not one in which the neutral
assists the parties in reaching a non-binding settlement. This process
resembles modem binding arbitration, not non-binding mediation.
Moreover, law dictionaries contemporaneous with the enactment of the
FAA defined "arbitration" as a dispute resolution procedure in which a third
party neutral decides the matter in dispute.169 For example, the 1910 edition
167Joint Hearings, supra note 163, at 14 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen,
member, American Bar Association, comm. on commerce, trade and commercial law;
General Counsel, New York State Chamber of Commerce).
168 Joint Hearings, supra note 163, at 36 (Brief of Julius Henry Cohen); see also
Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L.
R9v. 265, 272 (1926).
169 The Supreme Court just last term looked at a law dictionary contemporaneous
with the enactment of a statute in 1933 to help define the meaning of a term within that
statute. See Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 2295 (2004) (interpreting meaning of the
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of Black's Law Dictionary defined "arbitration" as "[t]he investigation and
determination of a matter or matters of difference between contending
parties, by one or more unofficial persons, chosen by the parties, and called
'arbitrators,' or 'referees."I' 1 70 Other contemporaneous dictionaries provide
similar, if not identical, definitions. 171 Thus, the common understanding of
the term confirms that the process of arbitration at the time of the passage of
the FAA did not include mediation.
Recent scholarship also has argued that the FAA does not cover
mediation. 172 Amy Schmitz forcefully argues that the courts interpreting the
FAA to include non-binding procedures have focused incorrectly on the
FAA's stated goal of enforcing contracts while ignoring the Act's goal of
providing for finality.' 73 Professor Ian Macneil's definition of arbitration
necessarily excludes mediation:
(1) the parties choose to have a dispute or disputes decided by a third party,
called an arbitrator; (2) the parties choose the arbitrator or a method for his
or her selection; (3) the arbitrator hears the dispute; (4) the arbitrator makes
a binding award; (5) the arbitrator's decision is, subject to very limited
grounds of review, final and enforceable by State law in the same manner as
a judgment .... Obviously, the fewer of the five characteristics listed are
present, the less likely the process is to be called arbitration.174
Professor Stipanowich contends that FAA arbitration "contemplates a
procedure before one or more private third party decision makers
term "enjoin" in the Tax Injunction Act by referencing the Black's Law Dictionary
current at its enactment).
170 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (2d ed. 1910).
171 See, e.g., BOUVIER's LAW DICTIONARY, STUDENTS ED. 81-82 (William Edward
Baldwin ed.,. 1928); WALTER A. SHUMAKER & GEORGE FOsTER LONGSDORF, THE
CYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF LAW 61 (1901).
172 See Schmitz, supra note 145 (arguing that courts should use common-law
contractual remedies, such as specific performance, to enforce agreements compelling
parties to submit to non-binding ADR processes as those are not covered by the FAA);
Amy Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality Through Functional
Analysis, 37 GA. L. REv. 123 (2002) [hereinafter Mud Bowl] (arguing that the FAA
governs only dispute resolution processes that yield a final, binding decision that is
subject to only limited review by the courts); Thomas J. Stipanowich & William L.
Matthews, Contracts Symposium: Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 Wis. L. REV.
831, 862-63 (arguing that mediation is incompatible with the FAA and stating that the
"statute-based law of arbitration is a wholly inappropriate ground for enforcement of
mediation agreements. Judicial attempts to group such processes under the statutory
umbrella are likely to result in considerable confusion, not to mention bad precedents.").
173 Mud Bowl, supra note 172, at 125-26.
174 MACNEIL, supra note 162, at 7-8.
358
[Vol. 21:2 20061
SECURITIES MEDIATION
('arbitrators'), and an adjudicative process of some kind culminating in a
final decision ('award')" that is binding on the parties. 175
Finally, an even more recent decision interpreting virtually the identical
dispute resolution program (RESOLVE) at the same company as the one at
issue in Fisher (GE) reached the opposite conclusion. Thus, in Lynn v.
General Electric Co.,176 the district court rejected the Fisher holding under
more recent Tenth Circuit precedent 177 and instead held that mediation is not
arbitration under the FAA.178 The Lynn court applied a two-pronged test first
used by the First Circuit 179 and followed by the Tenth Circuit in Salt Lake
Tribune Publ'g Co., LLC v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684 (10th Cir.
2004), to determine whether a dispute resolution procedure is arbitration
within the meaning of the FAA: "(1) 'how closely the specified procedure
resembles classic arbitration;' and (2) 'whether treating the procedure as
arbitration serves the intuited purposes of Congress." ' 180 Under the first
prong of this test, the district court reasoned that the non-binding mediation
procedure did not resemble arbitration at all. 181 Under the second prong, the
district court decided that Congress, in enacting the FAA, wanted to reverse
longstanding judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements, and thus
could not have intended the Act to encompass mediation agreements.' 82
Nevertheless, the implications of the Fisher court's holding that the FAA
governs agreements to mediate are troubling. 183 Parties must consent to
participate in mediation, and should be able to walk away at any time with no
ramifications. It is entirely voluntary and the notion that courts could compel
participation in the process or stay litigation pending compulsory mediation
seems inimical to its very purpose. Indeed, one advantage of mediation is the
lack of court involvement and thus the freedom of parties to operate without
judicial interference. Providing one party with the power to compel another
175 Stipanowich & Matthews, supra note 172, at 840.
176 No. 03-2662-GTV-DJW, 2005 WL 701270 (D. Kan. Jan. 20, 2005).
177 Salt Lake Tribune Publ'g Co., LLC v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684 (10th
Cir. 2004).
178 Lynn, 2005 WL 701270, at *6.
179 See Fit Tech, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 374 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2004).
180 Lynn, 2005 WL 701270, at *5 (quoting Fit Tech, 374 F.3d at 7).
181 Id. at *5-6.
182 Id. at *6.
183 1 have previously written about the dangers of the overextension of the FAA in
another context. See Jill I. Gross, Over-Preemption of State Vacatur Law: State Courts
and the FAA, 3 J. AM. ARB. 1 (2004) (arguing that state courts apply the FAA to motions
to vacate in situations when the Supreme Court's FAA preemption jurisprudence
suggests that state vacatur law would not be preempted).
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party to submit to mediation removes the self-determination and consent that
underlie the entire mediation process. Mediation should not be mandatory-
educate the parties as to the process and the mediators-but let them make
the choice.
Furthermore, imposing the FAA's substantive provision (section two) on
mediation is functionally equivalent to enforcing an agreement to mediate
future disputes under contract law. By and large, courts have refused to
specifically enforce an agreement to enter into good faith negotiations on the
ground that the promise is too indefinite under contract law. 184 Similarly,
courts should not enforce agreements to mediate future disputes under either
the FAA or under contract law principles because the sine qua non of
mediation is the party's consent to mediate at the current time. 185 Once that
consent is withdrawn, the entire foundation of the mediation has vanished
and the mediation procedure should end.
Moreover, the insertion of procedural devices into the mediation and its
outcome--devices such as arbitrators' subpoena power, the court's authority
to appoint mediators, and the parties' ability to enforce these devices through
motions or appeals-contradict its status as a flexible, informal, and mainly
amicable dispute resolution process. Instead, it imposes a degree of force that
mediation does not contemplate. Similarly, providing one party with the
power to confirm or vacate a settlement agreement arising out of mediation
confers courts with the ability to consider the mediator's process and the
merits of the outcome. This consequence is totally at odds with the notion of
self-determination as well as the confidentiality privilege, a hallmark of the
process.
While arbitration of a securities dispute is plainly covered by- the
FAA, 186 securities mediation, in particular, does not need the framework of
the FAA. The SROs have developed a simple forum rule structure to provide
minimal guidance to the participants in mediation. SEC oversight 187 ensures
that these rules cannot be changed without passing through the investor-
protective administrative lawmaking process. Any additional federal
regulation through a statutory scheme with policy objectives and
184 Schmitz, supra note 145, at 67-71. Schmitz argues that this reluctance stems
from anachronistic judicial doctrines and should be eliminated. Id.
185 See id. 64-65 & n. 325 (citing cases in which courts have refused to enforce an
agreement to mediate future disputes). Schmitz contends those cases were wrongly
decided as based on outmoded principles. Id.
186 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002) (applying FAA to
securities arbitrations).
187 See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
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considerations different than those of the 1934 Act would run the risk of
imposing provisions in conflict with each other in substance or in spirit.
In sum, the extension of Fisher out of the labor field into the securities
field would be an unwarranted extension of the FAA. Rather, to minimize
federal intervention in mediation so as to keep mediation an informal and
inexpensive process, courts should not apply the FAA to securities
mediation. SEC oversight provides the necessary federal protection of
investors; any additional regulation is unnecessary and inhibiting.
B. State Regulation
Regulation of mediation at the state level has been exploding over the
past decade. 188 State statutes governing mediation vary from provisions
mandating mediation of certain specialized types of disputes, 189 to provisions
for court-annexed mediation, 190 to more general provisions facilitating the
use of mediation. 191 Most of the state statutes address the confidentiality of
mediation communications, establishing some type of privilege, although
these laws vary considerably in the scope of protection they offer. 192
Because of SEC oversight at the national level, and the nationwide scope
of securities mediation, individualized state level regulation has the potential
to interfere with the uniformity of the process. In addition, like the inhibiting
effect the application of the FAA would have on securities mediation, state
mediation laws could also impede the flexibility of the process. In this
section, I explore whether any state mediation laws apply to securities
mediation and what effect that application has on the process.
Due to the variety of legislation across the country, it is impossible to
generalize about the impact of state law on securities mediation. However,
since the majority of securities mediations take place in Florida, California
and New York, 193 those states' mediation laws are illustrative of the potential
impact. Florida's statutes governing private mediation provide that the
188 See Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the
Privileges, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 15-17 (gathering statistics and estimating that, as of
2001, states had more than 2500 statutes with provisions affecting mediation).
189 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §383.160 (Lexis 1999) (legislation providing for
mediation of disputes involving Native American burial sites in Nevada).
190 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b -53a, 59a (West 2005).
191 See, e.g., TEx. Loc. Gov'T CODE § 174.151 (Vernon 2005).
192 Gregory Firestone, An Analysis of Principled Advocacy in the Development of
the Uniform Mediation Act, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 265, 270 (2003).
193 Email from Kenneth Andrichik, Senior Vice President, NASD Dispute
Resolution, Inc., to Jill I. Gross, Associate Professor of Law, Pace Law School (Nov. 3,
2004) (on file with author).
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parties can choose whatever mediation procedures they want, and the state
will grant immunity to mediators 194 and cloak the proceedings with a
confidentiality privilege.' 95 California law regulating private mediation
196
prevents mediators from testifying, 197 gives mediators immunity, 198 and
deems mediation communications to be confidential and thus protected from
disclosure. 199 Finally, New York neither has a general statute regarding
mediation nor does it have a subject matter-specific statute governing
securities mediation. However, the Judiciary Law provides that mediation
communications are confidential, 200 and its Civil Procedure Code requires
that mediation agreements arising out of a court action be reduced to writing
to be enforceable. 20 1
Additionally, in 2001, in response to nationwide discrepancies in
mediation rules and to "establish a consistent and predictable structure for
mediation," 202 particularly those rules regarding confidentiality of mediation
proceedings, 20 3 the American Bar Association and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws enacted the Uniform Mediation
194 FLA. STAT. § 44.107 (2005).
195 FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (2005).
196 See generally CAL. EVID. CODE, §§ 1115-1128 (Deering 2005).
197 CAL. EvID. CODE § 703.5 (Deering 2005).
198 Howard v. Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893, 897-901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
199 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (Deering 2005); see also Rojas v. Super. Ct. of L.A.
County, 93 P.3d 260 (Cal. 2004) (interpreting broadly the scope of California's mediation
confidentiality provision to preclude the disclosure of photographs, expert reports, and
derivative materials prepared for the purpose of mediation).
200 Ny JuD. L. § 849-b (McKinney 2005); see also Wright v. Brockett, 571
N.Y.S.2d 660 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (holding that mediation communications are
confidential); People v. Snyder, 492 N.Y.S.2d 890 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that
mediation confidentiality provision applies to criminal cases).
201 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2104 (McKinney 2003); Bartley v. Fed. Express Corp., 683
N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
202 Philip J. Harter, The Uniform Mediation Act: An Essential Framework for Self-
Determination, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 251, 252 (2002).
203 While the impetus of a uniform mediation act was to increase predictability and
simplicity so as to encourage greater use of mediation, the drafters also recognized "that
many different models of mediation appear to work well in different settings, and it might
be counterproductive to attempt to create a 'one size fits all' model for the practice of
mediation." Firestone, supra note 192, at 270; see also Prefatory Note, UNIF. MEDIATION
ACT (2001) (amended 2003), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/2003fmaldraft.pdf
[hereinafter Prefatory Note]. The drafters, therefore, focused their efforts on areas where
uniformity was required. Firestone, supra note 192, at 269.
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Act (UMA).204 The UMA, in those states that have adopted it,205 plainly
applies to securities mediation, as the Act's scope is quite broad.206
None of these state provisions appear to add an intrusionary layer of
regulation of securities mediation. Rather, to the extent they exist at all, these
provisions, particularly the confidentiality privilege, appear consistent with
the mediation rules of the SRO dispute resolution forums. 20 7
Notably, NASD supports the UMA because the UMA and the securities
mediation forum rules are very similar.208 For example, NASD Rule 10326
requires that no verbatim record be kept of mediation sessions, similar to the
requirement of section seven of the UMA that no final report be made by the
mediator. 2 9 NASD Rule 10406 and UMA's section four craft a similar
204See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (2001) (amended 2003). The ABA's approval
followed shortly after in early 2002. Id. The Act's Prefatory Note states that the UMA
has three major goals: (1) to "promote candor of parties through confidentiality of the
mediation process, subject only to the need for disclosure to accommodate specific and
compelling societal interests;" (2) to "encourage the policy of fostering prompt,
economical, and amicable resolution of disputes in accordance with principles of integrity
of the mediation process, active party involvement, and informed self-determination by
the parties;" and (3) to "advance the policy that the decision-making authority in the
mediation process rests with the parties." Prefatory Note, supra note 203, at 7.
205 As of the middle 2005, six states-Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio
and Washington-have passed the IJMA, and an additional six jurisdictions-
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota and Vermont-
have introduced bills in their legislatures to enact the UMA. See Uniform Law
Commissioners, Legislative Fact Sheet, A Few Facts About the Uniform Mediation Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uma2001 .asp (last
visited Nov. 3, 2005).
206 See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, § 3(a) (defining UMA's scope to include mediations
where the parties have an expectation of confidentiality).
207 See NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure Rule 10406.
208 In issuing a letter of support for the UMA in New York, NASD-DR expressed its
belief that the UMA is helpful to securities mediation because it recognizes mediation as
a useful and distinct ADR process, creates a uniformity of approach, and provides a
backdrop of rules that complement the NASD rules. Interview with Kenneth Andrichik,
supra note 23.
209 Section 7(a) of the UMA prohibits the mediator from making any report,
assessment, evaluation, recommendation, finding or other communication regarding
mediation to a court, administrative agency, or other authority that may make a ruling on
the dispute that is subject of the mediation. This prevents the "mediators from using the
threat of an unfavorable report to compromise the self-determination of any party."
Firestone, supra note 192, at 271-272. For further discussion of this section, see Carol L.
Izumi & Homer C. La Rue, Prohibiting "Good Faith" Reports Under the Uniform
Mediation Act: Keeping the Adjudication Camel Out of the Mediation Tent, 2003 J. DISP.
RESOL. 67.
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privilege that assures confidentiality in mediation communications. 210 And,
like NASD mediator disclosure requirements, section nine of the UMA
requires mediators to disclose conflicts of interest. Finally, NASD
mediation's overall emphasis on party choice2 11 is entirely consistent with
the UMA's promotion of the autonomy of the parties. 212 The two sets of
rules were written in the spirit of minimal intervention while securing
fairness and preserving party freedom.
Furthermore, since the parties consent to be governed by the forum's
mediation rules, these forum rules supplement any applicable state laws.
And, if NASD's Mediation Rules conflicted with a state's mediation law,
then the state law is likely to be preempted by the Exchange Act, on the
ground that the NASD rules were approved by the SEC as part of its
rulemaking oversight pursuant to the 1934 Act.2 13 Unlike the intrusion
threatened by an over-expansive state or federal court interpretation of the
FAA, state-level mediation laws do not threaten the fairness of securities
mediation.
III. THE FAIRNESS OF SECURITIES MEDIATION
As stated above, regulation is one way to ensure fairness in an ADR
process. 214 In this part of the Article, I will analyze whether mediation
210 UMA § 4 allows a mediator participant, a mediator or a third party to "refuse to
disclose" any mediation communication in a "proceeding." UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4.
The act defines "Proceeding" as "a judicial, administrative, arbitral, or other adjudicative
process including related pre-hearing and post-hearing motions, conferences and
discovery." UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 2(7). Thus, mediation communications are free from
discovery and not admissible in evidence in a legal or investigatory proceeding.
Firestone, supra note 192, at 272. For a detailed analysis of the UMA's confidentiality
privilege and its exceptions, see Hughes, supra note 188, at 24-68.
211 See discussion infra Part III.A.
212 The Prefatory Note states "it is important to avoid laws that diminish the creative
and diverse use of mediation. The Act promotes the autonomy of the parties by leaving to
them those matters that can be set by agreement and need not be set inflexibly by
statute." Prefatory Note, supra note 203; see also Firestone, supra note 192, at 271
(noting that the drafters of the UMA were intent to preserve the power of self-
determination that accompanies mediation).
213 See Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the 1934 Act preempts the application of California's Ethics Standards for
arbitrators to NASD-appointed arbitrators because the standards conflict with NASD
arbitrator disclosure requirements); Jevne v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 111 P.3d 954
(Cal. 2005) (same).
214 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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contains other, non-regulatory hallmarks of fairness for investors in a
securities dispute.
Fairness in adjudicatory processes typically is measured by the decision-
making process and the outcome as compared to established legal rules.215
However, as others have noted already, the confidentiality of mediation and
its other unique features do not allow observers to measure its fairness using
this comparison. 216 Moreover, unlike public judges, mediators are not
obligated to help parties reach outcomes that take into account just
distributions of public resources; they just must help parties resolve their
dispute.217
As a result, ADR scholars have identified alternative measures to
evaluate the fairness of a mediation process. For example, Professors Cole,
McEwen and Rogers argue that an "informed consent" model of mediation-
one in which party choice dominates-ensures fairness. 218 Professor Stulberg
examines the fairness of mediation through three dimensions: the
jurisprudential framework (i.e., did the parties secure what they were legally
entitled to?), substantive outcome (i.e., does one party end up worse off as a
result of choosing mediation over another dispute resolution process?), and
procedure (i.e., does the manner in which the mediator conducts mediated
communications undermine a party's integrity or self?). 2 19 Professor
Stemlight contends that participants in a dispute resolution process look for
three distinct benefits: substantive justice/fair result, procedural justice and
achievement of other personal and emotional goals.220 Professors Hyman and
Love have identified the categories of justice in mediation as reparative
215 COLE ET AL., supra note 90, § 2:2.
2 16 Id. They also contend that the goal of fairness may also conflict with the goals of
effectiveness, quality, and access. However, I believe that effectiveness, quality, and
access are dimensions of fairness and need not be considered in competition with
fairness.
217 Jonathan M. Hyman, Swimming in the Deep End: Dealing with Justice in
Mediation, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 19, 19 (2004) ("Mediators have no authority
to determine if a resolution is fair or just."); Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, If
Portia Were a Mediator: An Inquiry into Justice in Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 157,
158 (2002).
218 COLE ET AL., supra note 90, § 2:2. They write: "With some exceptions, the
evolving definition of 'fairness' in legal policies toward and commentaries about
mediation is the preservation of choice by the parties. That is, a mediation process is fair
if it preserves choice, and an outcome is fair if freely chosen by the parties." Id.
219 See Joseph B. Stulberg, Fairness and Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
909, 910-16 (1998).
220 Sternlight, supra note 16, at 299.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
justice (including restorative justice, retribution and revenge), distributive
justice; relationships and procedural justice.22 1
By synthesizing what I believe to be these complementary rather than
mutually exclusive views,222 I examine in this section of the paper the
fairness of securities mediation to the individual investor along five
dimensions: party choice, legal justice, substantive outcome, procedural
justice and achievement of non-legal goals.
A. Party Choice
This first dimension-perhaps the most important one to ensure fairness
in mediation223-examines the nature and scope of the "informed consent" of
the process participants. The securities mediation process revolves around
party choice and self-determination, leaving disputants with a strong sense
that they had a full opportunity to participate in its outcome: In fact, the most
important decision-the decision to participate at all-is determined entirely
by party choice. While one party can request mediation, no NASD mediator
will conduct a mediation session unless all parties consent to participate. 224
This contrasts sharply both with mediation in other contexts in which
participation might be mandatory,225 as well as with arbitration, where
investors' advocates continue to argue that customers have not given
meaningful consent to participate in the arbitration process.226
Furthermore, the mediation process is designed to maximize the parties'
control over the outcome. Mediators, who do not necessarily have to be
221 See Hyman & Love, supra note 217, at 162-74 (arguing that justice in mediation
comes from "below," from the parties, and not from above, from a public adjudicator).
222 The debate about what constitutes "justice" in mediation is beyond the scope of
this paper, and not necessary to resolve to analyze the fairness of securities mediation.
Indeed, I believe that many of these categories differ only by semantics, not by substance.
223 See COLE ET AL., supra note 90, at § 2:2.
224 NASD Rule 10401(c) ("Neither the [NASD] nor any mediator appointed to
mediate a matter pursuant to these Procedures shall have any authority to compel a party
to participate in a mediation or to settle a matter"); NASD Rule 10046(b) ("Mediation is
voluntary and any party may withdraw from mediation at any time prior to the execution
of a written settlement agreement by giving written notice of withdrawal to the mediator,
the other parties, and the Director").
225 See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution:
What Form of Participation Should Be Required?, 46 SMU L. REv. 2079 (1993)
(exploring obligations of parties and counsel to participate in court-annexed mediation);
Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling
the Tension in the Need For Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy and Confidentiality, 76
IND. L.J. 591, 599 (2001) (summarizing concerns arising out of compulsory ADR).
226 See discussion, supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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lawyers or judges, or even have securities law knowledge, are trained to
"identify areas of agreement, to lead each party to some understanding of the
other's position, to introduce a measure of reality into each party's view of
its own case, to induce reasonable concessions and ultimately, if successful,
to craft a mutually acceptable settlement. '' 227 "The mediator helps the
parties' face-to-face discussions remain focused and productive." Then, the
mediator may hold private caucuses with each party separately, and will
carry messages--clarifications, questions, proposals, offers, and counter
offers-back and forth between them.228 Because mediation is designed to
bring the parties together through caucuses and other facilitated
communications rather than force them further apart through adversarial
interactions, such as those in arbitration or litigation, parties leave the
mediation sessions feeling less confrontational and more in control of the
outcome.
The consensual nature of securities mediation is further illustrated by the
range of options offered to participants during the process. For example,
NASD-DR trains its mediators in a variety of techniques specifically to
maximize party choice.229 NASD's roster of mediators 230 spans the
evaluative to facilitative style spectrum.231 Evaluative mediators offer an
227 Ruder Report, supra note 11, at 47-48.
228 Mediation: An Alternate Path, supra note 10.
229 To be eligible for NASD's mediator roster, applicants must receive intensive
training. Interview with Kenneth Andrichik, supra note 23. While initially it did offer
mediator training, NASD-DR no longer offers its own training, as its rosters are
substantially filled with more than 1000 mediators. For outside training to qualify, it must
(1) cover a broad spectrum of ADR mechanisms; (2) teach techniques for mediators in
addition to theory; (3) provide significant role play opportunities; (4) address the ethical
considerations of a mediator; and (5) take place over several days rather than several
hours. In addition, any mediator trained outside the NASD must also have prior
mediation experience in other forums and demonstrated skills, as evidenced by four
references. Id.
230 This roster initially was comprised of NASD arbitrators who were already
trained as mediators, as well as commercial mediators recruited from other industries.
NASD was careful not to assume that arbitrators would automatically make good
mediators. Id.
231 In a seminal work, Professor Riskin proposed a grid to organize mediator styles
into a spectrum, to attempt to capture the plethora of styles utilized by mediators today.
At each end of the continuum are mediators defined as either evaluative or facilitative.
See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 50-51 (1996)
[hereinafter A Grid For The Perplexed]. I will not join the debate as to whether this grid
is appropriate, or whether evaluative mediation is even "mediation." (see, e.g., Kimberlee
K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REv. 71 (1998) (arguing that Riskin's grid should be "remapped" and that
367
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assessment of the merits of the respective positions of the parties, and
attempt to direct the parties towards a settlement.232 They see themselves as
the "voice of reason" and provide a reality check on the parties'
expectations. 233 In contrast, facilitative mediators let the parties craft their
own solutions, by clarifying and enhancing communications between
them.234 Facilitative mediators do not evaluate the merits of a position, but
assist the parties in evaluating their own positions.235
As a result, the parties have the option of choosing their own mediator
and mediaton style from a list provided by the forum.236 That list discloses
information about the mediator's "employment, education, and professional
background, as well as information on the mediator's experience, training,
evaluative mediation is out of bounds for a mediator); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative
Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 985, 1001 (1997) (criticizing Riskin's "grid" analysis as "implausible")), but rather
refer to Riskin's grid only for definitional and explanatory purposes. Moreover, in reality,
many mediators offer aspects of both of these styles, and practice somewhere along the
evaluative-facilitative continuum. Riskin has more recently adjusted his grid to use the
alternate terms "directive" or "elicitive" to describe mediator interventions. See Leonard
L. Riskin, Decision-Making in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid
System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 2 (2003).
232 Carole J. Brown, Facilitative Mediation: The Classic Approach Retains Its
Appeal, 4 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L. J. 279, 283 (2004).
233 Telephone Interview with Kenneth Andrichik, Senior Vice President, NASD
Dispute Resolution, Inc. (Jan. 11, 2005).
234 See A Grid for the Perplexed, supra note 231, at 24. For a fuller explanation of
the facilitative model of mediation, see Robert A. Baruch Bush, Substituting Mediation
for Arbitration: The Growing Market for Evaluative Mediation, and What It Means for
the ADR Field, 3 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L. J. 111, 112-16 (2002) (comparing
evaluative/directive mediation to transformative/facilitative mediation).
235 Brown, supra note 232, at 283. One additional mediation model-transformative
mediation-was identified in 1994 by Professors Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph P.
Folger in their book, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH
P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (1994). Transformative mediators help the
parties "identify the opportunities for empowerment and recognition shifts as they arise in
the parties' own conversation; choose whether and how to act upon these opportunities;
and thus change their interaction from destructive to constructive, as they explore specific
disputed issues." Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation, Inc., The
Transformative Framework, http://www.transformativemediation.org/transformative.htm
(last visited Nov. 3, 2005). This model and its underlying theory are now accepted in
dispute resolution circles as one possible model of mediation. See Dorothy J. Della Noce,
From Practice to Theory to Practice: A Brief Retrospective on the Transformative
Mediation Model, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 925, 926 (2004). However, very few
securities mediations follow the transformative model, so its relevance to securities
mediation is minimal.
236 See NASD Rule 10404(a) (2005).
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and credentials as a mediator."237 The ability of the parties to choose among
differing mediator styles to find the mediator style that works best for them
in their particular dispute legitimizes the party's control over the process. 238
Parties also have the choice of the time frame of the mediation process.
Court-annexed mediation sessions typically must take place on the spot
within a short time span. In arbitration, parties must await completion of
discovery before scheduling a hearing, and the scheduling of hearing sessions
is often dependent on the arbitrators' schedules and is out of the parties'
control. The time frame of mediation, in contrast, is dictated entirely by the
parties, and the forum can move as quickly or as slowly as the parties desire.
Finally, party choice is reflected in the variety of options available for
the presentation of the case, including the need to be represented by a lawyer,
the use of experts, the presence of parties and witnesses, and the offering of
documentary evidence. Unlike arbitration, where these variables are set by
forum rules, in mediation, all of these variables can be negotiated with the
mediator, and the forum rules contemplate only that the parties agree to the
process ultimately used. The emphasis on party self-determination is a strong
indicator of the fairness of securities mediation. 239
B. Legal Justice
This dimension examines what the parties are legally entitled to and
whether the process meets those expectations. At the outset, participants
enter mediation in the spirit of compromise, hoping to reach a resolution of
the dispute through settlement. Stated differently, the choice to enter
mediation reflects a judgment by both the investor and the broker/firm that
the dispute is not a "slam dunk" case for either side, and the nuances and
complexities of the dispute require a third party to find common ground.
237 See NASD Rule 10404(b) (2005). Today, NASD-DR does not look at whether a
mediator is evaluative or facilitative to consider adding him or her to its roster. Instead,
NASD-DR considers the overall quality,'prior mediation experience, and training of the
mediator. Id.
238 One downside of this choice is that repeat players have resisted using mediators
other than a narrow, comfortable roster as they are reluctant to acquaint themselves with
new mediators. Seminar Highlights: SM C&L Conference, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR,
April 2004, at 9. One certainly may view these as party failures rather than drawbacks in
the process. According to the President of NASD-DR, this phenomenon has resulted in a
"bottleneck" in the NASD mediation process. This bottleneck is caused by the parties
waiting for their favorite mediator and thus is a choice of the parties rather than a
breakdown in the process. Id. (quoting Linda Fienberg).
239 This emphasis on party choice equally strengthens the case for procedural justice
under Welsh's framework. See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
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Thus, any resolution is likely to reflect that spirit and will not secure "legal
justice" in the sense of all remedies in their entirety that a party might be
legally entitled to in court or arbitration. 240 That being said, in order to
achieve a mediated resolution, mediation participants necessarily must refer
to legal rules and remedies as a baseline on which to set expectations.
What are investors entitled to recover? Most customer complaints against
brokers involve four types of misconduct:24 1 (1) unsuitable
recommendations-the broker violated his duty to make recommendations
consistent with the customer's investment objective and financial
condition; 242 (2) churning-the broker controlled the customer's account and
used that control to engage in excessive trading for the purpose of generating
commissions; 243 (3) misrepresentations-the broker, intentionally or
negligently, made false or misleading statements of material fact on which
the customer relied when making an investment decision;244
and (4) unauthorized trading-trading without the customer's permission in
violation of a contractual or fiduciary duty.245
240 For that reason, an investor with a clear-cut, "slam-dunk" case likely has no
reason to compromise and should not consider mediation. See supra note 19.
241 See Black & Gross, supra note 2, at 1008-13; see also Ruder, supra note 50, at
1102-03 (acknowledging that alleged broker-dealer misconduct "usually follows a
familiar pattern characterized under recognizable headings"). Customers can charge this
wrongdoing through common law causes of action such as fraudulent or negligent
misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, or breach of contract/agency. Id.
242 See National Association of Securities Dealers Manual, Conduct Rule 2310
(2005), available at
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid= 1189&elementid= 115900046
6 (follow links to particular rule); see also Black & Gross, supra note 3, at 490-92
(explaining suitability rule in more detail).
243 SEC Rule 15c1-17, 17 CFR § 240.15c1-7 (2005); see also Black & Gross, supra
note 3, at 494-95 (explaining churning in more detail).
244 Claims for misrepresentation may be based on the antifraud provisions of the
Exchange Act, on state securities statutes, or on common law theories of negligent or
intentional misrepresentations. See Black & Gross, supra note 3, at 484 n.7, 495-496
nn.75-83 and accompanying text.
245 The NASD's Interpretive Material under Conduct Rule 2310 states that NASD
considers unauthorized transactions to be a type of fraudulent activity and thus a violation
of the member's fair dealing obligation. See NASD Rule 2310, IM-2310-2(b)(4)(A)(iii);
see also Black & Gross, supra note 2, at 1011-12 nn.131-34 and accompanying text.
Customers can also bring an unauthorized trading claim under breach of contract or
agency principles.
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All of these complaints require proof that the investor acted reasonably
both before and after the challenged transactions. 246 For example, to prove
liability for negligent or fraudulent misrepresentations, including those
stemming from potentially unsuitable recommendations or churning (both
often considered types of fraud), the investor must establish that the alleged
misstatement or omission was material-that there was a reasonable
likelihood that a reasonable investor would have considered it important in
making an investment decision.247 The investor must also show that he was
reasonable in relying on the broker's statements. 248 To prove liability for
unauthorized trading, the investor frequently must overcome a ratification
defense by proving that he acted reasonably after learning about a transaction
by complaining to the pertinent players.249 Finally, proof that the investor
acted with reasonable diligence in discovering the claim in a timely manner
is necessary to defeat statute of limitations defenses to fraud claims.250
The "reasonable investor" standard is an offshoot of the "reasonable
man" standard in tort law.251 What is reasonable will vary depending on what
is "demanded by the community for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk."' 252 Courts today, however, expect investors to understand
246 Robbins posits five questions that most arbitrators will want answered in
virtually any customer arbitration: (1) Did the customer reasonably trust the broker?; (2)
Did the broker breach that trust?; (3) Does the documentation support the claims?; (4)
How credible are the parties and the evidence?; and (5) Is the loss reasonably quantifiable
and did the customer take reasonable steps to mitigate damages? See ROBBINS, supra note
21, § 1-2.
247 See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-232 (1987); TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
248 See Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1991).
249 See, e.g., Modem Settings, Inc. v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 936 F.2d 640,
645-46 (2d Cir. 1991).
250 Under the limitations provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, "a private right of
action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in
contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws... may be
brought not later than the earlier of(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting
the violation; or (2) 5 years after such violation." 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2005). Courts find
that a plaintiff in a federal securities case has "actual knowledge" of the fraud for
purposes of triggering the one-year limitations period when he "obtains actual knowledge
of the facts giving rise to the action" or when a reasonable investor would have
discovered the existence of the fraud in the exercise of reasonable diligence. LC Capital
Partners, L.P. v. Frontier Ins. Group, 318 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
251 See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 n.6 (citing List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1964)).
252 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. (c) (1965).
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sophisticated investment concepts such as margin trading and its
consequences, 253 the time-value of money, 254 diversification and risk,255 and
the securities industry's compensation structure.256 If investors seeking
damages in court acted or failed to act because they did not understand these
concepts, courts (at least under the federal securities laws) will not permit
them to surmount the legal hurdle of reasonableness and will deny recovery.
Similarly, arbitrators, who look to this same law for guidance, must also
apply these anachronistic concepts even in today's complex securities
world.257
Does the mediation process alter this high standard at all? The answer
depends, in part, on whether the mediator has an evaluative or facilitative
style. In securities mediation, the evaluative mediator has gained favor more
recently, as lawyers practicing in, this field want a prediction as to the
likelihood of success in arbitration. 258 Using an evaluative mediator offers an
opportunity for investors to recover what they might be entitled to in
arbitration. Those mediators assess the governing law and help the parties
reach a settlement that conforms to the boundaries of that law and does not
exceed what investors would recover in arbitration, yet does not overly
penalize investors for choosing to forego arbitration. In addition, evaluative
mediators can revisit the capabilities and limits of the reasonable investor in
light of the complexities of the current markets. The evaluative process can
help the parties adjust their unreasonable expectations that might be
preventing a negotiated settlement.259 As a result, I believe that the
evaluative mediation process has the potential to resolve the dispute for the
reasonable investor through the dimension of legal justice, by assisting the
253 Zerman v. Ball, 735 F.2d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 1984); Newman v. L.F. Rothschild,
Unterberg, Towbin, 651 F. Supp. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
254 Levitin v. PaineWebber, Inc., 159 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998).
255 Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 1993).
256 Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 946 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir. 1991).
257 See Black & Gross, supra note 2, at 1013-26 (arguing that the law governing
customer-broker disputes is frozen in development since arbitration took over as the
mandatory forum for their resolution).
258 At PLI's Securities Arbitration 2004 Program, several panelists expressed this
view. The program was held in New York City on August 11, 2004.
259 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. Brokerage firm lawyers also
praise mediation as a method to convince the broker to resolve disputes, as it gets the
broker to the settlement table sooner than in arbitration, and provides a reality check to
brokers who think they have done nothing wrong.
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parties reach a settlement that takes into consideration relevant law, adjusted
for developments in the industry.260
One limitation to this potential, at least in theory, is that NASD-DR does
not require that the mediator have securities law knowledge. A mediator who
is evaluative in style but not knowledgeable about securities laws or the
industry might react to an investor's dispute with disdain for the investor's
lack of sophistication, or conversely, might overreact to the broker's
seemingly unprofessional conduct that did not violate any legal standards.
Without a securities background, the mediator cannot be fully evaluative, and
cannot steer the parties to a settlement that comports with legal justice.261
Another detractor from the potential for legal justice is the availability
and use by the parties of a facilitative mediator who does not view it as her
role to steer the parties in a settlement direction that comports with the
parameters of the law. Instead, a facilitative mediator will guide the parties to
a settlement that focuses on compromising the parties' legal rights and
sacrificing entitlements in order to resolve the dispute. In facilitative
mediation, an individual investor has the chance to avoid the neutral's
potentially harsh judgment in light of the demanding body of law and
achieve a resolution that partially satisfies the investor's perception that the
broker treated her improperly, even if the law would not permit recovery. As
a result, facilitative mediation has less potential to resolve the dispute
through the dimension of legal justice, but still has potential to resolve the
dispute satisfactorily.
260 While NASD-DR's current published materials suggest that its forum relies
predominantly on a facilitative model of mediation (see Mediation: An Alternate Path,
supra note 10 (stating that "[m]ediation is an informal, voluntary process in which an
impartial person, trained in facilitation and negotiation techniques, helps the parties reach
a mutually acceptable resolution" and explaining that the "mediator uses the private
caucus and other techniques to facilitate the negotiation" [emphasis added])), in fact, the
forum offers a wide variety of mediator styles, and the use of the word "facilitative" in its
materials does not necessarily express an institutional preference for facilitative
mediation. Rather, because arbitration already was evaluative in nature, and NASD was
trying to create an alternative for parties to arbitration, it chose to emphasize the
facilitative possibilities offered by mediation to raise awareness of the full spectrum of
possible mediation styles. Ultimately, the mediators disclose in their descriptive
biographies the style they use in mediation, and the parties can choose the style of
mediation they want to resolve their dispute. Interview with Kenneth Andrichik, supra
note 23.
261 Of course, in practice, parties choose their mediator with full disclosure as to that
mediator's style and background, so an investor can avoid this problem by choosing only
those evaluative mediators who have securities law knowledge.
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C. Substantive Outcome
This dimension explores whether investors are better off in mediation
than the mandatory alternative of arbitration as measured by the outcome of
the process. At first glance, arbitration is an appealing option. Statistics show
that investors recover some amount of monetary damages in about fifty
percent of cases that proceed to an arbitration hearing. 262 Those statistics
reveal an arguably investor-friendly forum.
Yet, upon further review, it becomes apparent that arbitration is
becoming more like litigation,263 and arbitrators frequently are applying
harsh legal standards to decide their disputes.264 Thus, arbitration might be
evolving into a less investor-friendly forum. With an eighty percent or more
settlement rate in mediation, investors must consider that mediation has a
greater chance of resulting in a satisfactory outcome,265 whereas arbitration
has a less than fifty percent chance of doing so.2 66
Ultimately, though, any conclusions about the substantive justice of
securities mediation are tentative without empirical data. 267 Because
mediation is confidential in both process and outcome, no empirical data
exists analyzing the outcomes of mediation. Moreover, by entering
262 See NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc., Dispute Resolution Statistics, Results of
Customer . Claimant Arbitration Award Cases,
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS GET PAGE&nodeId=516&ssSourceN
odeld=1 2 (last visited Nov. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Dispute Resolution Statistics].
263 See Black & Gross, supra note 2, at 998-1005.
264 See Black & Gross, supra note 3.
265 Those familiar with negotiation theory might argue that the 80% settlement rate
is skewed upward because parties who choose to enter mediation already have
determined that mediation is their best alternative to a negotiated agreement ("BATNA"),
so those parties have a strong incentive to reach a settlement. Even if the data is skewed,
it still is a relevant fact for those parties who choose mediation to know-as they also are
the ones who have determined that their BATNA is mediation. This paper does not argue
that investors with an extremely strong case on the merits should compromise by
mediation; rather, this paper argues that mediation is a viable alternative to arbitration or
negotiation for individual investors and not a process for investors to shun as unfair or
unlikely to yield a just outcome.
266 1 say less than 50% because investors who technically "win" an award but
recover a very small sum of damages may very well be unsatisfied with this outcome.
267 An illustration of this is a recently conducted empirical study of the impact of a
mediator's style on party satisfaction in EEOC mediation. See E. Patrick McDermott &
Ruth Obar, "What's Going On" In Mediation: An Empirical Analysis of the Influence of
a Mediator's Style on Party Satisfaction and Monetary Benefit, 9 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv.
75 (2004). This study demonstrates that scholars' academic debate about mediator style
and the fairness of mediation in a particular context is enhanced by empirical data.
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mediation, investors indicate their willingness to compromise. Assuming
they could establish liability at an arbitration and recover their losses,
investors consenting to resolve their dispute in mediation are giving up the
possibility of being made whole in light of a purist legal standard.
Thus, any analysis of substantive outcomes in mediation cannot be fairly
compared to outcomes in arbitration. Given this inability to assess
substantive outcomes combined with the inherent concession of legal justice
(especially with a facilitative mediator), our legal system should allow this
form of resolution of customer disputes only if we can be sure that parties do
not also sacrifice procedural justice.
D. Procedural Justice
What determines whether a dispute resolution process is procedurally
fair to the participants? As a threshold matter, the participants must have
unfettered access to the forum. In the case of securities mediation, investors
and brokers are provided with equal access to the forum. Parties to a
securities dispute can enter the mediation process through several avenues.268
First, NASD-DR suggests mediation at two points during the arbitration
process-a letter encouraging mediation sent to parties just after a case is
filed and a suggestion that the parties consider mediation during the
arbitrators' initial pre-hearing conference call. 269 Second, the staff prospects
cases ripe for mediation from the arbitration roster and proactively contacts
the parties and suggests mediation. Third, parties to a pending arbitration can
agree on their own to attempt mediation. Finally, parties can initiate
mediation without ever filing for arbitration. 270 These multiple levels of
access to the mediation forum ensure that parties who want to mediate their
dispute are not turned away.
Once a party has access to a forum, it is critical for the participants to
perceive that the system is fair.271 Professor Welsh, a leading advocate of
268 For a flow chart depicting the progression of a case through NASD mediation,
see NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc., Mediation Case Flow,
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&nodeld=531 &ssSourceN
odeld=522 (last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
269 Interview with Kenneth Andrichik, supra note 23.
270 Id. Roughly 85% of cases that enter mediation originated as arbitration. Only
15% of mediation cases originated directly in mediation. Telephone Interview with
Kenneth Andrichik (Dec. 13, 2004).
271 Stemlight, supra note 16, at 296-97 ("Most of us would agree that it is important
for disputants to feel that they have been treated fairly and justly by society's dispute
resolution systems.").
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procedural justice in mediation, 272 has identified four key elements that
"reliably lead people to conclude that a dispute resolution process is
procedurally fair": (1) the process provides an opportunity for disputants to
voice their concerns to a third party; (2) the disputants perceive that the third
party actually considered these concerns; (3) the disputants perceive that the
third party treated them in an "even-handed" way; and (4) the disputants feel
that they were treated in a dignified and respectful manner.273
As for the first criteria, the very nature of the process enables the
disputants to voice their concerns to a neutral third party, the mediator. An
effective mediator listens to the parties' concerns throughout the proceeding,
and responds to those concerns during the settlement process. Moreover, by
using highly trained mediators, NASD contributes to the parties' perception
of fairness. 274
NASD-DR's Mediation Ground Rules that set forth standards of conduct
for parties and mediators also contribute to the parties' perception of
fairness. 275 These Ground Rules stress the voluntary nature of the process, 276
272 E.g., Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real
Conversations with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 573, 580 (2004) (arguing that disputants both before and
after the mediation "value the process primarily for the procedural justice and the
resolution that it provides") (emphasis added).
273 Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from
Procedural and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49, 52 (2004) (citing Nancy
A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do With
It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787 (2001)). Professor Stemlight also recognizes the importance of
parties' perceptions of procedural justice, rather than distributive justice, to measure
whether participants believe the system is fair, but says more studies are needed. See
Sternlight, supra note 16, at 297-98.
274 Some investors' advocates have argued that some mediators of customer cases
are "repeat players" who derive a substantial portion of their income from mediating for
certain brokerage firms, and thus have an inherent bias favoring the firm. See Brian N.
Smiley & Steven J. Gard, A Message to Mediators, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Jan. 2005,
at 1 (contending that "there is a gathering concern that the process is serving the needs of
the brokerage community more than it is helping injured investors achieve fair
recoveries" and stating that "[t]o some extent, this perception stems from the realization
that fulltime mediators sell their services to a fairly small number of brokerage firms and
thus cannot afford to offend their repeat clients"). Smiley and Gard also contend that
certain mediators who are "often judged on and tout their own closure rates, would rather
convince an investor to take an inadequate settlement than let the negotiations 'fail."' Id.
However, mediators are obligated to fully disclose the scope of their mediation practice
and claimants are free to reject any mediator who appears to serve a particular firm
frequently to eliminate this potential bias.
275 NASD Rule 10406 (2005).
276 NASD Rule 10406(b) (2005).
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expressly deprive the mediator of the authority to "determine issues, make
decisions or otherwise resolve the matter, '277 provide for joint sessions as
well as separate communications between the mediator and each party,278
require cooperation and good faith from all participants, 279 permit direct
negotiations if the parties desire it,280 and preserve the confidentiality of
mediation communications. 281 The Ground Rules also provide for enormous
flexibility in adopting the process to meet the parties' needs as they allow
parties to amend the Ground Rules at any time during the process. These
Ground Rules focus on the integrity of communications among the
participants, strike a balance of decision-making authority between the
mediator and the parties, and empower the parties to communicate through
the mediator.
Additionally, with respect to the last three criteria, NASD-DR conducted
an informal study of party satisfaction in all three of the areas and found a
very high level of satisfaction with the mediation process and perception of
fairness by party participants. 282 Some of this satisfaction stems from the fact
that the entire process can be completed in a few months, whereas a
securities arbitration case takes an average of fourteen months to reach an
award from the date of filing.2 83 Additionally, pursuing a customer dispute in
mediation typically costs less than pursuing it through award in arbitration.
Most mediations finish in one day, as opposed to the typical multi-session,
multi-day arbitration hearings, for which forum fees and attorney's fees
accrue rapidly.284
277 NASD Rule 10406(c) (2005).
278 NASD Rule 10406(d)-(e) (2005).
279 NASD Rule 10406(d)-(f) (2005).
280 NASD Rule 10406(0 (2005).
281 NASD Rule 10406(g) (2005).
282 NASD Dispute Resolution, Mediation Survey (2003) (on file with author)
(reporting that an overwhelming number of those who responded to the survey felt that
the mediation was fair and unbiased and were satisfied with the mediation process). See
discussion supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
283 NASD-DR posts statistics on turnaround time of both arbitrations and
mediations filed in its forum. The most recent statistics available indicate that the average
turnaround time for mediation was about four months, whereas the average turnaround
time for arbitration was fourteen months. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note
262. While NYSE does not publish turnaround time data on its website, it is known
anecdotally that the NYSE turnaround time for arbitrations is slightly less than at NASD-
DR.
284 For example, for a $75,000 claim, a customer must pay $975.00 to file the claim
and for the first pre-hearing conference. After that, each day of hearings costs $1500.00.
See NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc., Arbitration Filing Fee Calculator,
http://apps.nasd.com/Mediation & Arbitration/ArbCalc/ArbCalcl.asp (last visited
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Parties are, of course, far less satisfied if there is no resolution of the
dispute.285 In that scenario, the parties have consented to mediate, paid the
forum fees, gone through the process incurring costs, including attorneys'
fees, and still ended up back where they started-needing to proceed with an
arbitration to resolve the dispute. Also, most mediations start out as
arbitrations. By proceeding with mediation, the parties participate in the
voluntary exchange of information that is characteristic of mediation. Yet, if
the mediator fails to resolve the dispute, the parties have disclosed
information for the other side to use at the arbitration hearing that they
otherwise might not have (for example, documents that parties did not need
to exchange before the arbitration hearing because they were reserving them
for their rebuttal case). Thus, by mediating the case, parties risk sacrificing
their informational advantage.286
One other procedural disadvantage in mediation is that parties who lack
access to documents and information in the possession, custody or control of
the adverse party are mediating at an informational disadvantage as
compared to a party to an arbitration or litigation who has been served with
discovery materials. Moreover, the fact that discovery devices are available if
parties are proceeding with a parallel mediation and arbitration might
incentivize parties to pursue both devices, even if mediation were otherwise
more suitable. This eliminates any cost and time saving advantage of
mediation. As a result, mediation is only an efficient process if the parties
settle their dispute.
E. Achievement of Non-Legal Goals
This dimension of fairness measures the degree to which the process
provides the parties with an opportunity to achieve any of their non-legal
goals. Investors with disputes against their brokers that arise in connection
with the business of their securities account typically want one outcome from
the dispute resolution process: monetary recovery. While money is the
Nov. 3, 2005). The same claim would cost $150.00 to directly file in mediation, and
$100.00 to file from a pending arbitration, and then the parties must pay the mediator's
costs and expenses, typically for one day of service and travel expenses. NASD Rule
10407 (2005).
285 Given that 80% or more of mediations settle, only a small number of parties fall
into this category.
286 Those documents would not necessarily fall under the NASD -mediation
confidentiality clause, which covers only "opinions, suggestions, proposals, offers or
admissions obtained or disclosed during the mediation. ... " NASD Rule 10406(g)
(2005). Because the vast majority of mediations originated as an arbitration filing, this
drawback is palpable.
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primary motivator in customer cases, investors might have other objectives to
achieve in pursuing the resolution of their dispute. These motives could
include the desire to punish the wrongdoers, the desire for an apology for the
broker's alleged unprofessional conduct, the desire for the firm to increase its
supervision over the broker so another customer does not become another
victim, or the desire to continue the investment relationship at the firm but
perhaps with a different broker. Conversely, investors might seek to
minimize the acrimony between them, as they formerly had a mutually
beneficial business relationship. Some customers simply want recognition
that the broker mishandled their investments, and it was not the customer's
lack of diligence that caused the losses. 287
Mediation can achieve these non-legal goals far better than arbitration,
which usually takes place over several hearing sessions, following months of
the adversarial discovery process. The parties only build more animosity in
the zero-sum process of arbitration and end up with one result: win or loss,
and some percentage of the claimed damages. A mediation settlement, on the
other hand, can include any provision the parties consent to enforce,
including an apology, a framework for future dealings, or even a provision
for the firm to step up its compliance efforts in the future.
Moreover, while many customer disputes are fact intensive, they can
raise significant public policy issues regarding the scope of the broker's duty
to his customer. Some customers might want to use their dispute to develop
the public law governing the brokers' duties. Some scholars have argued that
mediation is inappropriate to resolve disputes involving issues affecting the
public interest, because there will no development of precedent or public
announcement of rights.288 However, this concern is not pertinent to
securities mediation because the alternative to mediation is not adjudication
in court, but arbitration. 289 Even in arbitration there is no development of
287 1 have discerned these motives based on my experiences while co-director of
Pace Law School's Securities Arbitration Clinic, in which law students-under faculty
supervision-provide free legal representation to small investors who have arbitrable
disputes with their brokerage firms and brokers. In this capacity, over the past five years,
I have attended the interviews of countless public customers, and have heard investors
express a wide variety of non-legal objectives.
288 Sander & Goldberg, supra note 17, at 60 (stating that litigation may serve the
public interest better than mediation in the consumer fraud context where violations have
the potential to recur); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or
Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668, 676 (1986) (contending that "if ADR is extended to
resolve difficult issues of constitutional- or public law-making use of non-legal values to
resolve important social issues or allowing those the law seeks to regulate to delimit
public rights and duties-there is real reason for concern.").
289 Furthermore, if we view investors participating in securities mediation as part of
the disadvantaged class in America, then there might be cause for concern. See Edwards,
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precedent and no public announcement of a prevailing party's rights.290
'Thus, choosing mediation over arbitration will not decrease the already
frozen development of precedent in connection with broker-dealer liability to
customers.
In sum, the dimensions of party choice, procedural justice, and
achievement of non-legal goals clearly favor mediation over arbitration.
Investors have the potential to achieve legal justice in both arbitration and
mediation. The remaining dimension of fairness-substantive justice-
requires more empirical data in both mediation and arbitration before any
conclusions can be drawn about the fairness of their comparative outcomes.
This analysis illustrates that mediation is another ADR device that investors
have at their disposal other than arbitration, containing hallmarks of fairness
and offering the potential for a fair outcome.
IV. CONCLUSION
Lela P. Love's powerful image of justice in mediation depicts the
mediator as a supportive bridge between the real parties in interest that
reminds the parties of their need to communicate with each other to reach a
resolution, but leaves the parties to freely determine that resolution.291 This
image resonates in securities mediation. Its procedures and emphasis on party
choice, as well as its flexibility to achieve non-legal goals, provide justice to
disputants. And, this justice is obtained without the concomitant baggage of
its anti-investor distant cousin of court or its sister forum of litigation-like
(and arguably mandatory) arbitration.
. For those disputes that are not a slam-dunk for the individual investor,
this image also suggests that securities mediation is a real alternative to
arbitration, rather than a replacement. By expanding its mediation program
and by ensuring its fairness, NASD has promoted a diversity of ADR
methods for resolution of customers' disputes with their brokerage firms and
supra note 288, at 679 ("We must also be concerned lest ADR becomes a tool for
diminishing the judicial development of legal rights for the disadvantaged."). However,
investors today transact business in capital markets that are highly regulated with a view
to investor protection. While individual investors may have less bargaining power than
the repeat-player brokerage firm, they are not totally unprotected.
290 Black & Gross, supra note 2.
291 See generally Lela P. Love, Images of Justice, 1 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 29
(2000) (presenting images of justice of a judge, an arbitrator, and a mediator, and
expressing concern that current arbitration and mediation practices have "strayed" from
these images, risking a diminution of justice in these processes). For mediation, Professor
Love questions the fairness of an "attorney-dominated, adversarial and ever more costly
[mediation] proceeding." Id. at 34.
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brokers. Arbitration is still available for some; direct negotiation for others.
But, since securities mediation is a fair and flexible alternative, investors and
their advocates have no reason to shun the mediation process as a different
and unprotected forum. Instead, SEC oversight combined with harmonious
state mediation law provides an adequate level of regulation over the process.
The real danger lurks in the potential of overregulation. If courts
continue to follow the reasoning of the Fisher court and stretch the FAA
beyond its plain meaning to cover mediation of securities disputes, then
investors could be faced with airing the merits of the dispute in mediation,
and simultaneously battling collateral issues in court. Under this
interpretation, parties could invoke FAA provisions to create an infinite list
of litigable issues. This scenario would endanger the fairness and appeal of
securities mediation, as it would reduce party choice, flexibility and
procedural justice, decrease efficiency, and increase cost. The legislative
history is clear that the Congress that enacted the FAA intended the statute to
cover binding arbitration only, not non-binding mediation.
The history, development and modem state of dispute resolution for
individual investors suggest that mediation has the potential for exponential
growth. There is no reason why the securities mediation programs of NASD-
DR and NYSE should not be expanded to allow for maximum participation
by any willing disputants, as the process yields a satisfactory outcome for a
stunning eighty percent of participants who report an even higher percentage
of satisfaction with the process itself.
In light of the current controversy over the fairness of securities
arbitration, investors should more frequently choose Door Number Three-
Mediation. There is no pot of gold (is there ever?) behind it, but there is a
valuable prize: a real possibility of a fair opportunity to resolve a dispute. To
me, that's a deal worth making.
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